


PRS-NEA-88-049  
1 JULY 1988



**FOREIGN  
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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-88-049

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21 JULY 1988

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## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### PFLP Leader Discusses Regional Relations, PLO Separatists

44040253 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic  
19 May 88 p 12

[Interview with PFLP Politburo member 'Abd-al-Rahim Mulawwih, by 'Irfan Rashid, Damascus, date not given]

[Text] Rome (AL-WATAN)—PFLP Politburo member 'Abd-al-Rahim Mulawwih stated that "the powerful popular uprising that has spread throughout the occupied homeland, the PLO's evident role in it, and the national and pan-Arab responsibilities the uprising dictates to all the parties that stand confronting the Zionist entity's campaign of terror and repression against the masses of the occupied homeland—these things have played a role in preparing the way for the developments that have occurred in Syrian-PLO relations."

This was said during a telephone interview AL-WATAN conducted with Mr Mulawwih from Damascus. The following is the text of the interview.

[Question] A few days before his death as a martyr—on the Day of the Land, to be precise—Abu Jihad [Khalil al-Wazir] stated in an interview I conducted with him for AL-WATAN that a noticeable improvement had been realized in relations with Syria and that a high-level delegation might visit Damascus soon, with himself at its head. To what extent has his return to Damascus [to be buried] as a martyr contributed to develop relations and accelerate their normalization?

[Answer] Yes, a definite improvement had already been achieved. The visit would probably have taken place—indeed, even at the level you indicated in your question. A series of meetings had in fact already taken place on various levels to discuss mutual relations and ways of normalizing them. Perhaps it is important here to point out the position the Syrian leadership took in opposing the Shultz plan, a position agreeing with the Palestinian position of rejecting this plan and calling for confronting it and thwarting its goals and the results at which it aims. It became exceptionally important for the two basic parties opposed to this imperialistic project to cooperate, and this demanded normalization of relations and surmounting the previous state of separation by developing and deepening relations and giving them the required struggle-related dimension. The Syrian leadership's decision to receive the body of the martyr Abu Jihad was a political decision whose reasons Syria understood. This was made clear by Syria's all-out preparations to receive all the personalities of the [Palestinian] leadership without conditions or restrictions. In return, from the PLO point of view, the decision to bury the martyred leader [in Damascus] was a political decision taken in awareness of the dimensions of the step—indeed, one that strove to realize them. In any case, the Syrian and Palestinian decisions reflected the the high spirit of

responsibility in which rapprochement and normalization have been begun. Thus, preliminaries for the normalization of relations existed before the leader Abu Jihad returned [to Damascus] as a martyr, but his return as a martyr doubtlessly played an important role in speeding the process and opening broad horizons for it.

[Question] Then the normalization process is based on the overcoming of points of difference, and is not a purely tactical step.

[Answer] Yes, that is the case—particularly in light of the circumstances of the heroic uprising. It would not be reasonable, appropriate, or natural for Syria to be on the side of the uprising and to support it without normalizing relations with its leadership. From my view of the size and extent of the basis for meeting, the relationship is not of a tactical, temporary, and transient nature. I think this basis is large and of an important and fundamental political kind. Supporting the uprising, opposing the Shultz plan, and other points are not transient, temporary, or secondary matters. But as to whether all the points of difference have completely ended, my answer is negative. I think the questions of PLO-Egyptian relations and relations with certain Jewish forces still arouse a certain disagreement. There are also some other problems involving the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and the ordering of the Palestinian household. These include the strengthening and reinforcing of Palestinian national unity by having the Palestinian factions that are still outside the PLO join through the holding of a new session of the Palestinian National Council in Damascus.

True, the common ground was greater than the matters of disagreement. This allows us to be justifiably optimistic. But surmounting the differences will require further discussions, meetings, and contact.

[Question] Can the respective rejections by the PLO and Syria of the Shultz plan lead to the emergence of a united position?

[Answer] From the political point of view, grounds for the emergence of a united position are available. I made that clear when I referred to this groundwork as a preliminary factor to normalization of relations. However, if by your question you mean the emergence of joint working papers and coordinated political actions in Arab meetings at the summit or other levels, the matter in its practical aspect is under discussion and deliberation between the PLO leadership and Syria. At the Damascus meetings it was agreed to continue coordination through Comrades Faruq al-Shara' and Abu-al-Lutf [Faruq al-Qaddumi].

We in the PFLP are working to move the issues of mutual coordination between Syria and the PLO forward.



[Question] To what extent will the martyr's death of Abu Jihad and the development of relations with Syria influence the furtherance of the uprising?

[Answer] There is no doubt that one of the reasons that induced Israel to assassinate the leader Abu Jihad was Israel's knowledge of the important role the martyred hero was fittingly playing in leading the uprising, as head of the Supreme Committee for Affairs of the Occupied Territory, and from the position of his great responsibilities in Fatah and the PLO. They knew his outstanding role in lighting the torch of armed struggle through uninterrupted years of indefatigable and dedicated labor. Thus, the goals of the assassination of the martyred leader were closely linked to an attempt to influence the morale of the internal leadership and the morale of the insurgent masses of the people, who have shown and continue to show heroism rarely equalled in history as far as I know. But the winds do not always blow the way one wants. The masses of our people in the territories, supporting their united national leadership, made the martyrdom of the militant Abu Jihad an opportunity to escalate the popular struggle. They transformed the entire homeland into real battlefields. They made the enemy lose his nerves, so that he committed even more crimes. A single "day of wrath" resulted in 18 martyrs and more than 300 people wounded. In brief, our masses in the territories reacted at a level commensurate with their feeling of the gravity of the loss. It was a reaction characterized by steadfastness, defiance, and resolve to continue the uprising until it achieves its goals of freedom and independence.

Outside the territories, not only did the treacherous assassination play a role in hastening the return of Syrian-Palestinian relations and in rallying the masses resolutely around the PLO as expressed in the demonstration of half a million people who marched behind the body of the heroic martyr, but the masses of our people wherever they were and in all their communities rallied even more around the courageous uprising and around its leadership. It is hardly necessary to mention the campaign of disapproval and criticism that greeted the [assassination] operation in various Arab and international quarters and levels.

Finally, I wish to state that the loss of Comrade Abu Jihad was a great loss because of his qualities of militancy and leadership. The Zionist enemy does not perceive, or does not want to perceive, what is going on in the homeland. It is the revolution of a people in all its groups and classes, in all its cities, villages, and camps—men, women, and children, standing in one line behind their united national leadership that is determined to continue the struggle until all national goals are achieved.

As for the second half of the question—the role of relations with Syria in supporting and furthering the uprising—we in the PFLP and the PLO know and understand the tremendous reserves and reservoir of

revolutionary spirit that our masses possess. From a strong feeling of national responsibility toward the courageous actions and sacrifices of our heroic people, and in order to insure the factors that will lead to victory and the realization of our national goals, we work to foster an Arab environment that will provide the indispensable factor of active support for the internal uprising. This gives Syrian-PLO relations extremely important dimensions in the struggle, dimensions that lay the foundation for a new stage of confrontation and opposition and for a stage of national uprising. These are dimensions that we have lacked in the last few years.

[Question] To what extent does the uprising have the resources to continue? Are there possibilities for the occurrence of fundamental shifts in it?

[Answer] The resources to continue are available. We do not say this merely out of wishful thinking or optimism. Our people have amazing abilities to struggle. Their leaders have a rich experience of confronting Zionist terrorism. Given the presence of a number of other factors, these abilities and this experience I have indicated will constitute a real guarantee for the continuation and escalation of the uprising.

[Question] What are the most important factors necessary for the achievement of this?

[Answer] On the internal level, extension of the national committees in all areas to all groups in the cities, country, and camps, so that these committees become capable of running the mass movement according to a comprehensive plan and on all levels. We have made great headway in this area.

—The cohesion and unity of all factions in the territories and the urging of all energies on the basis of the daily and tactical slogans of the uprising, and then its general and overall slogans—especially the slogan, "Freedom and independence." We attach particular importance to the need to bring the mass movement into synchronization with those slogans and to oppose any calls for bypassing or retreating from them. We have made great headway in this area and in the area of the unity and cohesion of the basic factions in the territories. Their unity and cohesion are high and correspond to the seriousness and sensitivity of the problems of the struggle.

[Question] The absence of the dissident Fatah leaders from Abu Jihad's funeral procession confirmed the depth of the rift between them and the PLO. Do you think that the reconciliation with Syria will also lead to an automatic reconciliation in this area?

[Answer] No, I don't think so. The gulf of disagreement is too great to be covered over so quickly and in this way. One might even say that I think a reconciliation between the PLO and those you called dissidents is remote and difficult. The realistic, rather than abstract, possibilities for it are nonexistent, unless we in the groups of the

PLO, with the cooperation of brothers in Syria and all the parties desiring a closing of Palestinian ranks and strengthening and consolidation of their unity, are able to convince them of the need to turn away from their extreme and reckless ideas and abandon the path of attacking the PLO.

Through the committee set up by the recent session of the Palestinian National Council, a committee that is continuing to carry on a dialogue with all the groups still not affiliated within the PLO, we are always fully prepared to open unconditional and unrestricted dialogue with this group, in hope of reaching a sound, democratic solution to this problem. As for the problem that still exists with the other factions not affiliated within the framework of the PLO, the extent of the difficulties is far less compared to the difficulties that exist with the group to which you referred. There are encouraging harbingers of a solution of the differences with them.

With some of them, meetings and negotiations have actually begun, and matters are moving in a way that inspires optimism.

[Question] The uprising has created international impetus and widespread solidarity with the Palestinian cause. What will your next steps be to develop this situation, increase international solidarity with the cause, and confirm Israel's isolation?

[Answer] The uprising has indeed created a situation of this sort. We take pride in the extent of solidarity the powers of socialism, progress, and peace have shown and are showing with the struggle of our people against the new Nazism represented by the Zionist leadership.

We express profound gratitude and thanks to this great camp whose solidarity with the struggle of our people forms an important support for victory and the achievement of our permanent and legitimate national rights.

Despite this bright picture of the amount of support, assistance, and solidarity these powers express toward the struggle of our heroic people, we look for even more aid, because our fight continues, and our enemy is vicious and arrogant. He is an enemy of everything noble, just, and human, not to mention his hostility to culture, progress, and peace.

Our next steps to develop this situation will be steps for political movement on all fronts at the international level. The PLO Executive Committee and Political Department have a comprehensive plan for all international gatherings and for international rights, social, and humanitarian organizations. This plan aims at exposing the Zionist entity's policy of suppression and terror. It aims at working to isolate it and expel it from international political life and gain more support for and

solidarity with the just struggle of our people. In particular, we are trying to obtain more UN and Security Council resolutions supporting our rights to a return, self-determination, and an independent state.

[Question] The uprising has been able to create sharp splits and breaks in Israeli society. How do you plan to take advantage of this new situation, especially on the eve of the upcoming Israeli election? Are there possibilities for developing relations between you and the Israeli democratic left?

[Answer] Taking advantage of this situation depends on the continuation and escalation of the uprising. This will necessarily be reflected in the splits and breaks to which you have referred. These splits and breaks are of no small importance. In fact, in light of our view of the course of development of the uprising and of the Palestinian national struggle against the Zionist enemy, they stand to deepen. We in the PFLP understand the importance of this factor in our struggle against the Zionist enemy. We understand how important it might become if it deepened and the role it might play. We realize that Israeli society, despite the dominance of the Zionist ideology and of special conditions that remove the outward signs of conflict within this society, is a society subject in the end to the constants of social conflict. Therefore, the more the uprising deepens and the closer it comes to realizing its goals, the more it will cause a process of social and political separation and polarization within Israeli society. We will work to benefit from this process and from whatever serves the interest of social progress in our region.

I want you to note that the process of social and political polarization that you referred to in Israel is a phenomenon having its own special features that it is difficult for us to see from a sound scientific perspective unless we study and analyze these features. Although it would be difficult in this interview to give a complete and detailed explanation of our viewpoint, I would like to draw attention to the phenomenon called "the peace camp" in Israel. It is an important phenomenon, but one that is not coherent and that does not yet show sufficient elements of political stability. The camp does not possess a political program that answers to the elements of a just settlement based on recognition of the permanent national rights of our people. However, we realize that certain phenomena of political "reasonableness" are crystallizing in the circles of this wing. As for the other direction—the trend toward the right in Israeli society—which is the other side of the polarization equation to which I referred, this is a stronger, more vigorous, and more coherent phenomenon. Fascist bands and troops of settlers receive full support from the authorities and from the rightist parties. The Labor Party is moving more and more to the right; its latest platform leaves no room for doubt. Thus, the right in Israel is not in retreat corresponding to the increase of the peace camp. This is a problem that makes it important to see the particular features of the process of social and political polarization



going on and likely to increase. Finally, I want to state that as a process it is in any case important, and we must make good use of it in our just and lengthy battle.

As for the possibility of developing relations with the Israeli democratic left, it is important for us to define the possibility first and rely on practical bases for such a definition. We believe that the democratic forces in Israel are represented basically in the Communist Party (RAKAH) and in some other left-wing forces and organizations. We do not think the forces that espouse the Zionist ideology fully or partially—if one may use the expression—are democratic forces in the aforesaid sense of the term. The possibility of developing these relations exists; indeed, it is something necessary and is being followed up by a special committee emanating from the PLO.

[Question] How will you define relations with Egypt, in light of the development of relations with Syria?

[Answer] The 16th session of the Palestinian National Council defined relations with Egypt, and this definition was confirmed in the 18th session in Algeria. Relations basically depend on the Camp David regime in Egypt abandoning the Camp David agreements. We in the PFLP consider the decision of the recent National Council session to be correct. We do not think the new conditions and relations between the PLO and Syria will demand more than the implementation of this decision and abiding by it. What we want is to reach a commitment to this decision.

The experience of the past year has proved that Egypt gains more from relations with the PLO than the PLO gains. The PLO forms a political cover for the regime. The regime is working to take advantage of this cover relationship to put pressure on some PLO leadership circles to accept political formulas liable to threaten the PLO's unity and threaten its uniqueness as political representative of the Palestinian people, formulas based on a political program inferior to the program of national consensus—indeed, essentially contradicting it.

We in the PFLP have been and still are for breaking relations with the Egyptian regime as long as that regime every day and at every opportunity announces its adherence to the [Camp David] agreements. We will work to have the PLO take practical positions consonant with this decision approved by the National Council.

12937

## ALGERIA

**Measures Aim at Privatizing Real Estate**  
45190074 Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French  
2 Jun 88 p 14

[Article by Baya Gacemi]

[Text] No more tenants. Everyone should become the owner of his apartment or his shop. This is the state of affairs which new measures taken by the government aim to achieve. The long blocked putting up for sale of apartments built after 1981 is becoming effective.

This measure is motivated by the economic crisis that will not permit the State to continue massive investment (10 billion dinars a year) in housing. Another reason is put forward: the desire to make the tenant aware of his responsibilities and for him to maintain the premises he occupies.

The goal of this move is, according to Mr Nourani, minister of land development, urban planning, and construction (MATUC) "to regain the capital invested and to recycle it in building programs planned before the crisis." This program, determined within the framework of the 1986-89 Five Year Plan, continues and Mr Nourani assesses that "the results may even be exceeded." After that the State will completely disengage itself in order to "devote its efforts to the most disadvantaged categories and regions in need of development."

This transaction concerns 350,000 apartments constructed between 1981 and 1988, which will cost between 14 and 22 million centimes. All assistance is granted; even the text of the law stating the non-transferability of housing for a period of 5 years has been repealed. Thus, after acquiring the apartment, the owner may resell it. "We want to create a real estate market," says Mr Nourani.

Be that as it may, the present occupants of apartments "should, in their own interests, buy them." Those who cannot or do not want to do so must be prepared to pay the scheduled increases. "It is necessary to deal with the reality of rental rates."

As for the OPGI [Office for Promotion of Real Estate Management], it will have to play a maintenance role, once it is relieved of its rental responsibilities. If it cannot assume this role, it will be overtaken by firms or real estate agents that the future owners will be able to choose.

## EGYPT

**'Abd-al-Majid Expects Exports to Moscow To Triple**  
45040146C Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic  
23 May 88 p 2

[Article by Muhammad Barakat]

[Text] The Egyptian ambassador in Moscow, Salah Bas-yuni, has announced that Dr 'Isma' 'Abd-al-Majid's visit to the Soviet Union is considered a positive turning point in the relations between the two countries. It is considered a new page in these relations leading to supporting and strengthening such relations in all fields.

The ambassador said that the positive results which this visit had accomplished go back in the first place to President Mubarak's policy of strengthening friendship



with all international powers. It also goes back to the realistic policy of the Soviet leader, Gorbachev, and the continuing consultation between the two leaders.

He said that, on the political side, it is enough to refer to Soviet leader Gorbachev's statement that the visit is a historic one in the relations between the two countries.

On the economic side, the visit offers strong support to the economic and commercial relations between the two countries, since an agreement was signed to organize the framework of cooperation in these fields.

In private statements to AL-AKHBAR, 'Abd-al-Majid confirmed that there would be a radical change in the trade structure between the two countries and an increase in the amount of Egyptian exports to the Soviet Union, particularly in nontraditional products [as published], so that these exports cover the amount of the installments we will be paying in return for Soviet financing which we receive for Egyptian projects. Egypt's cash flow will not be burdened as a result of this economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, but will even be able to improve the deficit in the balance of payments with the Soviets by way of exports.

He added that the volume of Egyptian exports will triple during the coming years.

9455

**Israeli Tourists Circulating Counterfeit Dollars**  
45190068b Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX in French  
20 May 88 p 1320

[Text] More than 20 percent of the individuals arrested last year for passing counterfeit dollars in Egypt were Israeli tourists, according to an Egyptian Ministry of Interior report published in the last issue of the Egyptian weekly periodical AL-MOUSSAOUAR. The second largest group was citizens of other African nations.

According to this periodical, which is affiliated with the Presidency of the Republic, 91 cases involving the circulation of counterfeit \$100 bills were reported in 1987. In 20 of these cases, the individuals involved were Israeli tourists, the report said. This document added that the majority escaped any penalty, however, claiming that they acted in good faith and that the bills had been given to them by Israeli exchange bureaus.

In all, a total of \$2,100,000 in counterfeit \$100 bills was seized by the Egyptian police last year. Of this total, bills worth \$1,500,000 were manufactured locally in Egypt.

In conclusion, the document emphasized that a number of Egyptians, forced into buying dollars on the black market because the legal banking circuit is unable to provide them with foreign exchange, have also become the victims of counterfeiters, and thus could find themselves suddenly stripped of all their savings.

5157

**Joint Firms With Arab Investors To Provide Financing**

45190068c Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX in French  
20 May 88 p 1320

[Text] Three investment companies with joint Egyptian-Arab capital totaling \$600 million Egyptian pounds (\$266 million) are to be established in Egypt very shortly. They will be industrial, agricultural and tourism companies, with 40 percent of the capital obtained by public subscription. Mr El Gharib, president of the Egyptian investment body, has also announced that current Arab investments in Egypt are estimated at 3 billion pounds, and they may reach 4 billion before the end of this year. A law recently approved by the Egyptian parliament will allow foreign investors, those from the Arab nations in particular, to purchase real estate assets in Egypt in the future. Basically, this law is designed to encourage investments in the agricultural, construction and tourism sectors. In addition, some 85,000 Arab tourists from the Gulf are expected to visit Egypt this summer, on the basis of the contracts signed recently by tourist agencies.

5157

**Former Minister Discusses Strategies for Encouraging Investment**

45040161a Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic  
28 May 88 p 7

[Rifat Kamal report on interview with 'Abduh Muhammad Salam, founder of the pharmaceuticals industry]

[Text] After spending years abroad, he returned to Egypt with tens of thousands of dollars, which he spent on a number of shares in an Egyptian investment company that produces basic materials which the state requires, and even imports. After five years, and an arduous journey, the honest citizen went to inquire about the profits from his entire assets. He almost did not believe his ears when he heard the shocking news: No profits!

He then attempted to correct his initial error, and decided to sell the shares. Another calamity befell him; the prices of the shares had declined, and he could not find anyone to purchase them!

Thus, the slogan rang out: Anything but investment!

This slogan passed from mouth to mouth and became a fixed certainty affirmed by everyone's experience—investment is devoid of profit and causes losses.

Dr. 'Abduh Mahmud Salam, the former minister of health and founder of the pharmaceuticals industry in Egypt, states: We need to encourage Egyptian investors first. We need to study their problems, and remove the obstacles in their path. If Egyptian investors succeed, Arab and foreign investors will flock to Egypt!

Thus, we must recognize that foreign investors will not invest in a country whose local investors face problems. Preparation of a general atmosphere which is appropriate for investment has become a pressing need.

Dependence on imports to meet basic needs has increased. At the same time, the population is increasing at a high rate, and this increase is naturally being accompanied by a need for new employment opportunities which will not be available unless production projects are undertaken. These projects will not be undertaken unless there is a good investment atmosphere. Such an atmosphere cannot exist unless investors are able to place their funds in programs which benefit themselves as well as the state. These projects must provide the investor with a guaranteed profit which exceeds the guaranteed profits of investment certificates exempted from taxes, i.e. a minimum profit of 20 percent!

It is strange that the investment companies involved in the production of agricultural products, poultry, and pharmaceuticals, and in land reclamation, are currently facing a clear setback in production after extensive efforts were invested in their establishment. Why?!

The stories of investment companies in this field are numerous. Approval of a project first requires the authorization of the investment organization and the consent of the pertinent ministry. The committees convene to give their authorization, but all the studies and authorizations become meaningless when they reach the office of the minister. The personal opinion of the minister is the determining factor. A project can die if it is not authorized by the investment organization and the ministerial committees.

The investor must fight to obtain the personal agreement of the minister, after which he must fight with numerous other organizations.

Customs, for example, requires extraordinary efforts: It is well-known that production equipment is exempt from customs duties. Nonetheless, there are lists, committees, and experts, and exemption from customs duties is not subject to defined regulations. Rather, the obtaining of an exemption has become a subject for debate.

As for organizing the procurement of the energy and water needed to operate a factory, this is another story.

Every program is the subject of a benefit analysis which clarifies its production potential, costs and profits. But in Egypt, we find that benefit analyses are untimely due to the fact that they are prepared at a time which differs completely from the times designated for implementing the project and production operations. We therefore find that the calculation of equipment costs doubles in the period between the preparation of the benefit study and the decision to purchase this equipment! The same thing

happens with regard to raw materials needed for production. This causes many severe hardships for investors, who have to repeatedly recalculate.

We then have to take measures to import raw materials needed for production, which leads to the interruption and discontinuation of production. Moreover, the long time period required to import successive batches of these raw materials causes costly price differences, which are transformed into losses when the fixed price of production is taken into account!

Finally, there is the matter of product price: The state requires investment factories to purchase energy and water at cost, i.e., without subsidization. In addition, the state imposes obligations on factories in all of its financial decisions issued in favor of government employees. All of these expenditures are logical. But it is illogical if they are not taken into account when calculating production costs!

It is correct that the investment law exempts investment factories from price fixing. However, some ministries are determined, one way or another, to subject the output of investment factories to obligatory price fixing under the slogan of protecting the consumer from price increases.

At this point, investment projects, which face losses, or which cannot generate a profit in even the best of conditions, meet their demise!

Can investments currently be used to establish large factories?

The previous years witnessed the establishment of modern industries at the highest level. World-class factories and excellent production were seen. However, administrative complications led to the ruin of these factories and the absence of profit-making opportunities for them.

It is obvious that the basic decisions pertaining to investment are clear and encouraging, but the implementation of these decisions is filled with gaps that can destroy the most successful program. These gaps allow personal arbitrariness to come into play under the motto of supervision and control.

A firm policy, which provides investors with security, is currently needed to enable investors to proceed without shocks or complications. If this happens, funds will be brought out from under mattresses and directed toward investments which provide good, national production, and which increase employment opportunities while decreasing the burdens imposed by having to import.

The call for investment will not succeed as long as investment factories distribute profits which are less than the profits of investment certificates. If profits reach 20 percent, and if profits are spent at the moment



of investment—and not five years later—stagnant funds will come forth from every house to establish a new industrial structure with Egyptian funds before foreign funds.

13286

**High Commission To Supervise Islamic Banks**  
45000116c Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 12 Jun 88 p 7

[Report by 'Ali al-Maghribi]

[Text] It has been decided to form a high commission to issue legal opinions and provide oversight to serve Islamic banks and companies, including branches of the Islamic public sector banks. This was announced yesterday by Dr Ahmad al-Najjar, general secretary of the International Federation of Islamic Banks. He said that the administrative council of the Federation had agreed on the creation of the commission in its last meeting.

Dr al-Najjar added that the Federation did not agree to accept capital utilization companies [overseas remittance investment firms] that applied for membership in the Federation. This was because they did not fulfill the membership conditions, the most important of which are that these organizations be public and not private, that their basic system stipulate adherence to the Islamic Shari'ah, and that they have a legal oversight organization for their transactions.

**New Investment Companies Established**  
45000116a Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 9 Jun 88 p 6

[Report by Anwar Muhammad]

[Text] The committee for establishing companies in the Ministry of Economics and Foreign Trade has decided to found 14 new investment firms with a capital of 14,500,000 pounds. They include 7 joint stock companies without public subscription and 7 limited liability companies. These new companies will operate in the domains of commerce, industry, services, and the distribution of educational books.

Dr 'Atif 'Ajwah, head of the administration in charge of companies, announced that Arab and foreign participation had increased by about 17 percent in the past 4 months. It was observed that leading Arab and British investors are interested in establishing companies in Egypt, where the total sum of foreign participation invested by Saudi and British companies has amounted to 109,500 pounds. This is the result of state economic policies conducive to stability in Egypt's investment climate which have promoted the flow of capital to Egypt.

**New AL-AHALI Chief Comments on Newspaper, Party Roles**  
45040146A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 2 Jun 88 p 6

[Article by Lutfi Wakid, New Editor-in-Chief of AL-AHALI]

[Text] It is said that the changes that have taken place in the NPUG Party are a rightist coup in the leftist party. This is a campaign of assumptions. The party has its directives from which it will not deviate.

Our policy in the newspaper will be based on representing the party's policies and implementing the charter on which AL-AHALI was founded from the beginning; i.e., that it is a newspaper owned by the NPUG Party and that it expresses the viewpoints of all Egyptian citizens.

The deciding factor in this matter is the extent to which the newspaper has deviated from the party's line and directives.

We will work on broadening the base of participation in the newspaper, opening its doors to all the national forces, opposing wrong policies and propagating an independent judgment on alternative solutions.

The Nasirists are the major part of those who formed NPUG from the start. I maintain that even if there were a Nasirist party NPUG would not be incompatible with Nasirism.

As for us, Nasirism is not the worship of an individual but the belief in the July Revolution and in the overall policies of 'Abd-al-Nasir, recognizing the negative sides of practicing them and trying to benefit from the circumstances of this revolution.

We hope that the Nasirists gain more ground in the NPUG Party and that all national and progressive forces gain ground inside the NPUG.

The NPUG Party has its own features in which all the fundamental currents of the party are fused. The Central Committee's decisions were made by an almost unanimous majority.

In this respect, I believe in absolute freedom of the press. As for the direction of flow of the party's paper, there must be a close cohesion between the positions of the party and its newspaper.

I want to tell you something. Had it not been for party leader Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's nominating me as chairman of the board of directors and chief editor of AL-AHALI—he chaired the Central Committee meeting himself—I would not have thought about such a matter. I accepted the nomination for the good of both the party and the newspaper.



There had been a prior decision by the Central Committee in its second-to-last meeting to turn the party toward working for and moving freely among the masses. This development began in the party and ended in its newspaper.

We do not mean at all a coup against the "left". We are more leftist than they are, unless leftism consists of words they brag about instead of conduct and stands.

Other leadership positions in the newspaper and other organizational subjects were referred by the Central Committee to the general secretariat so that it might redraft a new statute for AL-AHALI, as well as naming its board of directors and the new editorial board.

9455

### **Cairo Drinking Water To Come From Ground Reserves**

45040146B Cairo /IL-AKHBAR in Arabic  
23 May 88 p 6

[Article by Mahmud Ghunaym]

[Text] The Ministry of Housing, Utilities and New Communities will begin a series of measures governing water consumption. After the successful experimental construction of the first ground water station in al-Marj, it was decided to expand the usage of ground water as an alternative to Nile water. It will begin operating next month and will produce 50,000 cubic meters of drinking water per day. It will supply the regions of Madinat al-Salam, al-Marj, and 'Ayn Shams and will cost four million Egyptian pounds.

It was decided to expand, constructing similar stations in the provinces.

Engineer Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, minister of housing, utilities, and new communities, announced this in the meeting he held for the ministry's leadership and the department heads concerned with governance of water consumption.

It was also decided that the new cities would depend on ground water as a major source for their drinking water requirements, and that a meter would be installed for each apartment in these cities.

The minister added that concentrated efforts would begin at the training center for pipe molding and water faucet maintenance in 'Ayn Shams to graduate maintenance crews at a high level of efficiency.

The minister issued his instructions to the heads of departments in the new cities to follow up the industrial units there to confirm that they are using recycled water for industrial purposes after purifying it.

Engineer Kamal Hijab, head of the water utility in Greater Cairo, announced that average water production in Greater Cairo had reached 3.8 million cubic meters per day, which is one of the highest rates in the world. He confirmed the necessity of reducing water consumption because 35 percent of it is being wasted due to misuse.

9455

### **Government Increases Tobacco, Gasoline Prices** 45190068a Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX in French 20 May 88 p 1319

[Text] The increases, effective as of midnight on 14 May, in the price of gasoline at the pump, ranging between 33 and 40 percent, and in the price of cigarettes manufactured in Egypt, ranging between 18 and 23 percent, partially satisfies the demand of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A delegation representing the IMF is expected to visit Cairo shortly to resume negotiations with the Egyptian government. The government justifies the new increases, which are expected to bring in an additional 330 pounds (a dollar is worth 2.28 pounds) on the basis of the need to finance the purchase of electric plants to offset the reduction in electric current caused by the reduced flow of the Nile and to put the Egyptian tobacco company, which is showing a deficit, back on its feet again.

In April, the negotiations with the IMF came up against the demands the Fund was making of Cairo as a condition for allowing a new rescheduling of a part of the foreign debt, estimated at more than \$40 billion, and the release of the second portion of the standby credit totaling \$320 million, of which Egypt has only received \$150 million.

On 21 April, Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Sedky confirmed disagreement with the IMF on numerous points during the negotiations. Apart from energy rates, the IMF criticized Egypt for maintaining an artificial rate of exchange of \$0.70 to the pound, representing an indirect subsidization of such goods of first necessity as wheat, flour, tea and sugar. Subsidizing these products is costing the state nearly \$2 billion per year, but thus far, the government has refused to eliminate the subsidies at a single stroke, as the IMF demands. However, it is willing to replace them gradually with allocations to the neediest individuals, in order to safeguard social peace.

The IMF has also demanded an increase to 20, or even 25 percent, in bank interest rates, in order to attract the foreign exchange assets of Egyptian immigrant workers, which the state needs. The government refused, arguing that such a measure would affect the execution of development projects included in the 1987-1992 5-year plan.

However, the low bank rates are allowing Islamic investment companies to drain off between \$8 billion and \$12 billion by means of "profit shares" of about 25 percent. Rather than limit these companies, which are operating

illegally, the government wants to lead them gradually into operating in accordance with the laws governing financial establishments. It plans to promulgate a law in this connection very shortly.

5157

#### **Farmers Receive Loans Worth 600 Million Pounds**

145000116b Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 6 Jul 88 p 4

[Text] Dr Yusuf Wali, deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, has announced that the volume of seasonal loans extended to small farmers by the Agricultural Development and Credit Bank amounted to 600 million pounds last year. He said that a study was presently being completed on methods of participation by the state in reducing soil improvement costs for the small farmer.

This took place during the first meeting of the Council of the Central Agricultural Cooperative Union after it was formed under the leadership of Mahdi Shuman.

### **IRAQ**

#### **Minister Gives Estimate of Oil Reserves**

44040283 Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic  
6 Jun 88 p 1

[Excerpt] Iraqi Oil Minister, 'Isam 'Abd al-Rahim, announced that oil reserves in Iraq are greater than the announced official figures of 100,000 million barrels of proven oil reserves and 50,000 million barrels of probable oil reserves.

He said that the figures announced by the Iraqi oil ministry are not propaganda; to the contrary, they lean towards being conservative. There are still vast areas in Iraq which have still not been explored.

This announcement came in the second part of an article written by the Iraqi oil minister and published yesterday in Baghdad.

He asserted that a complete review of the reserves of all discovered fields in Iraq indicates that proven reserves amount to 100,000 million barrels and that probable reserves amount to no less than 50,000 million barrels.

### **ISRAEL**

#### **Ultra-Orthodox Call on PLO To Aid in Closing Sex Shop**

#### **Neturey Karta Request Special Session of Security Council**

44000149 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew  
14 Jun 88 p 2

[Text] The Neturey Karta have decided to appeal to the PLO executive committee, to request that the PLO's UN representative initiate a special session of the Security

Council, to debate the opening of sex shops in Jerusalem. "We are turning to you as our representatives," says the letter, "to aid in protecting the purity and holiness of Jerusalem." The Neturey Karta are, on this occasion, appealing to the UN to make Jerusalem a de facto international city, in order to deal with "the Zionist atrocities."

#### **Rabbi Urges That Shop Be Closed**

44000149 Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING  
HERALD in English 17 Jun 88 p 8

[Text] The PLO leader Mr Yasir 'Arafat has been asked to deal with a sizzling Middle Eastern conflict that does not involve the Palestinians.

It is a row between ultra-orthodox Jews and secular Israelis over the opening of a sex shop in holy Jerusalem.

Rabbi Moshe Hirsch, self-styled "Foreign Minister" of the tiny anti-Zionist Neturey Karta group, has urged Mr 'Arafat to intervene to close down what he calls an "abomination that sells sin."

The offending shop, which opened last month, is the brainchild of a pair of Tel Aviv businessmen.

By Western standards, the business is coy. Closed blinds and a small Hebrew sign announcing "S. Style" (the S. is for sex) are all that can be seen by unsuspecting passers-by in the busy Klal commercial mall just off Jaffa Road.

There were three customers in the shop yesterday - including one orthodox man in a knitted skullcap.

Rabbi Hirsch, whose community rejects the Zionist concept of a Jewish state before the coming of the Messiah, told Mr 'Arafat: "The temporary domination of Palestine by the Zionists has caused the desecration and impurity of holy places which are situated on occupied territories. We turn to you to help maintain the sanctity and holiness of Jerusalem, the spiritual citadel of the world."

### **KUWAIT**

#### **Performance of Economy Profiled**

44040249 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
3 Jun 8 p 33

[Text] Kuwait has experienced positive developments in its domestic economy and foreign investments despite the effects of the escalation of the Iranian-Iraqi war, which have affected Kuwait's economy more than the other Gulf economies. Even though the continuation of the war has deprived Kuwait's economy of the psychological stability which it needs in the aftermath of the Manakh market crisis, Kuwait's economy has been able to adapt to the difficult circumstances affecting the region.

In the course of the past 4 years, the Government of Kuwait has continued to apply an austerity budget, which is reflected in a decline in expenditures. During fiscal years 1984-85 and 1985-86, expenditures totalled approximately 3,100 million Kuwaiti dinars—i.e., less than that estimated in the budget—whereas revenues totalled 2,745 million dinars in 1984-85, and 2,345 million dinars in 1985-86. The final figures, however, surpassed expectations, and the deficit totalled 61 million dinars. But, after taking into account the income of Kuwait foreign investment assets—estimated at 2,493 million dinars—there appears to be a budget surplus of 1,732 million dinars.

The budget deficit in 1986-87 is estimated at approximately 1,140 million dinars. This figure increases by 331 million dinars if allocations for the future generations fund are added, which constitute ten percent of annual revenues. The budget deficit drops, however, to only 51 million dinars if foreign investments estimated at 1,118 million dinars are taken into account. The total amount expended in fiscal year 1987-88 increased by 3.5 percent to 11.6 billion dollars compared to 10.5 billion dollars in the previous budget.

Positive factors pertaining to the Kuwaiti budget are its somewhat expansionist character, and the active, monetary policy pursued by the Kuwaiti Central Bank to expand local, economic activities during 1988.

Kuwait was one of the first Gulf countries to realize the positive advantages of domestic borrowing in order to strengthen general revenues, and reduce the withdrawal of foreign funds. It implemented an advanced, general debt program, which offered intermediate-term treasury bonds for the first time in the region. Likewise, in an unprecedented step in the Gulf economy that went into effect on 21 September 1987, the Kuwaiti government borrowed 1,400 million dinars in the form of treasury bonds, or loans, in order to generate partial or complete financing of the budget deficit, and to furnish the local financial market with stimulating, financial instruments. The period of the bonds, which are considered liquid assets by the Central Bank of Kuwait, varies between 91 days and 10 years. The central bank has permitted commercial banks, and other financial institutions which supervise them, to subscribe to the new instruments. It has also allowed non-Kuwaiti investors to purchase them.

The total combined balance of Kuwaiti commercial banks at the end of last August was 10,244 million dinars compared to 9,252 million dinars in 1985, and 9,408 million dinars at the end of 1986. The debts of the private sector totalled 5,156 million dinars at the end of 1986 compared to 5,001 million dinars at the end of 1985. The debt of the private sector increased by 7.1 percent at the end of August 1987 to 5,524 million dinars. Deposits totalled 4,562 million dinars toward the end of August 1987—i.e., they have increased by 110 million dinars since the end of 1986, when private sector

deposits totalled 4,364 million dinars in the form of fixed-term deposits comprising 53.4 percent of deposits, while saving deposits comprised 12.7 percent of deposits, demand deposits comprised 13.5 percent of deposits, and foreign currency deposits comprised 20 percent of deposits. Foreign assets in Kuwaiti banks totalled 2,244 million dinars at the end of August 1987, increasing by 65 million dinars (three percent) over those recorded at the end of 1986, whereas foreign debts at the end of August 1987 totalled 1,243 million dinars compared to 1,214 at the end of 1986. Likewise, in the same period, the capital and reserves of the banks totalled 973 million dinars compared to 899 million dinars at the end of 1986, and 832 million dinars at the end of 1985.

Generally, during 1987 and the first half of 1988 there has been a continuous improvement in the performance of Kuwaiti banks. The profits of these banks will continue, however, to be affected by the debt settlement program introduced by the government in August 1986, and by the establishment of the necessary reserves for paying off bad debts. It appears that more than 90 percent of the settlements between banks and their clients have been concluded. This program, which ensures the government's complete support of the banks, guarantees the rights of shareholders, which were publicized at the end of 1985.

Kuwait was the only Gulf country which escaped the negative effects of the decline of the dollar in relation to its own currency because of the linkage of the Kuwaiti dinar to a basket of currencies. At the beginning of last year, Kuwaiti monetary authorities permitted the dinar to rise against the dollar after the value of the dinar had declined along with that of the dollar during the previous 2 years. However, since spring 1987, those authorities have allowed the dinar to decline along with the dollar. It is clear that the central bank allowed the dinar to be disassociated from the exchange rate of the dollar during the period in which it desired to stem the flow of capital abroad, and attract Kuwaiti deposits from abroad.

13286

## LEBANON

### **Junblatt Discusses Current Crisis, Partition, Syrian Role**

44040241b Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic  
4 May 88 pp 28-31

[Interview with Walid Junblatt, by 'Amir al-Jabiri and Ghazi 'Abdallah: "God Knows What Will Happen!" date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] The crises in Lebanon; its civil war; the siege of the Palestinian camps; the repeated kidnappings; the near-total collapse of the Lebanese economy; and, finally, the resumption of explosions and booby-trapped cars, the most recent incident of which took place last week in Tripoli—in view of the approaching Lebanese



elections, AL-YAMAMAH covered all these issues and crises and new developments on the Lebanese scene in a frank interview with Walid Junblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party and Lebanon's Minister of Public Works and Tourism.

[Question] How bad is the Lebanese crisis? What stage is it in now?

[Answer] I feel that we are still spinning like a top in search of a solution, going from settlement to the lack of settlement. By this I mean that we have been repeatedly turning to Saudi Arabia and Syria, from Geneva to Luzanne to Bikfaya to the National Unity Ministry to the Tripartite Agreement and finally to a paper, or more properly a settlement proposal, presented by the Americans through their emissary, Murphy. So far, we have been going around in futile, sterile circles.

In my opinion, it is impossible to reach a solution with the isolationist trend which wants to get Lebanon out of the Arab-Islamic circle and tie Lebanon to Israel and the West. Of course, this does not mean that I have lost all hope, but this has always been my view and always will be.

[Question] Now that some time has passed since all the talk about partition, cantons and mini-states, do you think that partition might be imposed? Where do you stand on this? Who in particular is striving to partition Lebanon?

[Answer] We all agree on the geographic meaning of partition. Partition means linking Jazzin with Suq al-Gharb, which in turn means controlling the area which we, the Progressive Socialist Party, control. In 1982, Bashir al-Jumayyil tried to drive out the mountain people. We successfully resisted, but this does not mean the end of the conspiracy. No, the plot to restore the so-called Lesser Lebanon still lives. In other words, there is a consensus among the Islamic majority of Tripoli, the North, and Beirut. They want to control the mountains. Whoever controls Mount Lebanon controls all of Lebanon. The plot still exists.

[Question] Isn't what Lebanon is now undergoing a de facto partition?

[Answer] There are areas of influence. There are the mountains, controlled by the Progressive Socialist Party, and the Sidon of Mustafa Sa'd and the so-called Nasirite Organization. The South is controlled by Amal, and Beirut is controlled by the Syrian forces. In the Christian North the Phalangists are in clear control, from the Museum to Jisr al-Madfun.

[Question] Doesn't this situation help those groups who are calling for partition, or reinforce this concept among them?

[Answer] The only thing we in the party and the National Front can do is fight this trend towards partition, because if we go along with it we will have fallen into the Israeli trap. Israel cannot survive in the Middle East unless the Middle East is fragmented into sectarian mini-states and Jerusalem becomes the capital of the Arabs. We are against this trend, and we will fight it with every means at our disposal. But of course we want Arab assistance, and we want to alert the Arabs to this danger.

[Question] Which group is leading this plan for partition?

[Answer] These are old ideas which first emerged in 1948 with the founding of Israel. Here I might mention Moshe Dayan's letters to some of the isolationists, and his correspondence with Pierre al-Jumayyil and Camille Sham'un. These ideas crystallized and became stronger after the Arab defeat in 1967 and the emergence of the so-called Tripartite Alliance of Pierre al-Jumayyil, Camille Cham'un, and Raymond Iddi. Later on, these ideas were adopted when Bashir al-Jumayyil was elected, and the plot still exists. It has retreated, but it is not dead.

[Question] Is there any Islamic group or party calling for partition?

[Answer] I don't think that any Islamic party supports partition, because any attempt to fragment the Islamic ranks would mean war among the Muslims, and I don't think anyone would assume the responsibility for this. However, there have been various proposals from the Islamic side. Unfortunately, the Islamic side is not in harmony with itself. The Islamic ranks must be united.

[Question] What foreign parties stand behind and support the concept of partition?

[Answer] Mainly Israel. The United States has its own interests here, but ever since we first experienced American Middle East policy, we have been well aware of the strength of the Zionist lobby in the United States. The Arabs have always looked forward to the American elections, in the hope that the next president would be free from Zionist influence, and we have always made the same mistake. So far, the Zionist lobby is strong, very strong. There has been only one instance—the Arabs' experience with President Eisenhower, who was the only one who was ever able to curb Israel. Since his time, there has been no other strong president.

[Question] Do the Soviet and American stands differ in how they deal with the Lebanese crisis, or are they similar?

[Answer] At least the Soviet Union's stand calls for Lebanese unity and independence. The Soviet Union has been on the side of the Lebanese citizens and has helped them. The Soviet Union does not send its ships to strike at a nation's territories. Of course, so far the United States' stand on Lebanon has not been positive. We hope

that American policy towards Lebanon will change, but so far we don't see any noticeable radical change, in spite of all the consultations and contacts.

[Question] What is your stand on the repeated kidnappings in Lebanon?

[Answer] No sane person can accept such actions, nor can one accept airplane hijackings. They must be stopped at any cost, and laws and international guidelines must be formulated to put a stop to such acts.

[Question] You have good relations with Damascus. Do you have any observations to make on the Syrian presence in Lebanon? What do you think of the Syrian role in general?

[Answer] The Syrians entered Lebanon to try to solve the Lebanese crisis. Their entry into Lebanon was accompanied by Israeli and American objections, and the Syrian role was thwarted. So far, the Syrians have tried every means of establishing security and stability in Lebanon, but there are outside forces fighting against these Syrian attempts. For us in Lebanon, our doorway to the Arab world is Syria. It is only natural for Lebanon to have excellent relations with Damascus, as long as Lebanon's independence and sovereignty is assured.

Right now, we are working with the Syrians to try to find a way out of the Lebanese crisis, which, as it seems, will be difficult, not easy.

[Question] Could you give us some idea about the platform you have put forth as part of your candidacy in the upcoming elections?

[Answer] We stand for abolishing political sectarianism in Lebanon; i.e. all Lebanese should have an equal right to vote. Lebanon should be a single entity. If necessary, sectarianism should be abolished and a council of elders created which would represent all sects equally and which would decide all important Lebanese issues. There should be a supreme judiciary which would be independent of the executive authority, and there should be a social economic program for developing the poorer areas.

[Question] Who do you think will be the lucky candidate in the presidential elections? Will it be Raymond Iddih?

[Answer] He is a distinguished Lebanese politician who has spoken out courageously and clearly. I don't know whether he is lucky, but I hope he will be. I don't know whether present conditions will help his election.

[Question] How many Druze are there in Lebanon?

[Answer] Actually, there are no precise figures. The last census of Lebanon was in 1932, in the days of the French mandate. One of our basic demands has been for a census. In addition, demands have been made to resolve

the circumstances of the so-called "hidden ones." There are tens of thousands of such persons, whose citizenship is under review or who have no citizenship at all, who are existing on charity. I think that they are mostly Muslims, like the Arabs of Wadi Khalid, who are living there without authorization. How many Christians have they given citizenship to, or Assyrians, Chaldeans, or Copts, for political reasons? We are ready for a census. As for the Druze, for example, I can be exact. In the sense of a Druze minority, we are 10 percent, but as members of Islam we are at least 60 percent.

[Question] What about Saudi Arabia's aid to Lebanon?

[Answer] This aid has always reached the right place at the right time. I wish that the Kingdom would help Lebanon by building certain definite projects such as electricity, dams, roads and the like. Such projects must be supervised by the Kingdom, for otherwise the money might be misdirected, at least until the political situation settles down.

[Question] What is the story on the soldiers you sent to Libya?

[Answer] At a certain point, when al-Qadhdhafi went to war with Chad and asked for help, we sent him this symbolic assistance. It is a known fact that some Arab and Palestinian organizations sent thousands of soldiers, while we sent 400 persons, no more and no less, only as a symbolic contribution and as an expression of gratitude for the assistance al-Qadhdhafi gave us at certain times. I am thinking in particular of the mountain war, when al-Qadhdhafi gave us weapons and money. We hope that this crisis will be solved and the problem between him and Chad will be settled peaceably and diplomatically, and that the issue will be referred to the International Court of Justice.

8559

**Foreign Mercenaries Discuss Their Role**  
44046241a London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
18-24 May 88 pp 28-31

[Article by 'Umar Muhammad: "Fighting For Money: Mercenaries In the Lebanese War"]

[Excerpts] "Bashir Jumayyil threw us into the bloodbath. He sent us towards the "Rif Bank" in central Beirut, a strategic point near the main headquarters of the Phalange in West Beirut's Rivoli Cinema area. The other fighters were taking up positions around and inside this bank. Then we got hold of two armored cars belonging to the Lebanese Army. In the beginning, we were able to cut off the road to the bank under fire and to set fire to it. The battle was very heated, but we finally succeeded in occupying the whole bank building." These are the words of Harteau, one of the team of mercenary officers and soldiers who fought during the early part of the

Lebanese war, particularly among the ranks of the Phalange and the National Liberals, as both commanders and troops. Harteau's account was obtained from some notes and scattered papers found in the dossiers of the mostly French mercenary officers and soldiers, as well as from statements made to journalists and even to official agencies in their own countries.

According to the testimony of some of the mercenaries, there were more than 150 of them in Lebanon, which is a record figure, since mercenaries are usually battle commanders. They worked with just about every Lebanese organization and militia, no matter what its orientation, as combatants, weapons and training experts, and planners.

Jean Kay says that there were only 25 mercenaries in Katanga-Congo, all of whom were professional officers skilled in military action and combat who were paid in advance in dollars. In Katanga, they commanded battles, combat units, and entire brigades. It should be noted that there are very few of them around now, now that the fighting in Lebanon has quieted down.

In Lebanon, Kay says, "We led combat units and carried out commando (storm troop) operations, as well as battles for positions. There were a lot of us, because we were setting up and then leading entire militia units. At the same time, we engaged in individual combat, especially whenever we got more dollars for it."

Besides the dollars, there were intellectual or ideological motives which led the mercenaries to take part in the Lebanese war, but the most important thing for them was the money they were paid. They say that the highest salaries they ever received were in the \$70,000 range, and they were paid additional sums for each battle in which they participated directly.

According to their statements, those who came to fight in Lebanon had already fought in Katanga-Congo, Rhodesia, Vietnam, and other Asian and Middle Eastern countries.

In their statements and papers, they say that they led the earlier operations launched by the Phalange and the "Lebanese Forces" as a whole. They also set up and trained the Phalange's early units, and also organized the broad outlines of Phalangist propaganda.

#### Who Are They?

Who are these mercenaries who "kill whatever moves," as they say in Lebanon, i.e. shoot at anything that moves, anything that is alive? They make the most vicious, criminal snipers because they made no distinction between a child or a woman or an old man, between a civilian and an armed man. They are incapable of carrying out any operations in which they must pick out their targets, because they would lose money. They are paid by the result, by the number of victims of their

sniping or killing missions. They are hard-hearted, and their hands are accustomed only to cocking a gun, which is always the act of a deadly killer. So they were in Vietnam, and so they are in Lebanon.

#### A Specialist Mercenary With a Lebanese Wife

Jean Kay is a longstanding member of the G.A.J., a French organization which was founded after the April 1961 attempted coup by French officers opposed to Algerian independence, an attempt which was foiled by Late French President Charles De Gaulle. He says, "I hijacked a Pakistani airliner on 3 December 1971 and landed it at Orly Airport in France, where I demanded medicines for Bangladesh, in accordance with the demands of the leaders of the operation which I was carrying out for them. I fought against General Ghurn in Biafra, Nigeria, and then in two Arab countries. My father, who was one of those French officers renowned for their racism, was killed during the Algerian war. When I first started out with the Phalange, I worked as a military instructor, dividing my time equally between the studio, with Sita, and the mountains, where I trained Phalangist students in guerrilla warfare and commando (storm trooper) operations. My star pupils were Bashir al-Jumayyil and Elie Hawi (the first president of the Phalangist War Council, who was killed in the Tall al-Za'tar battle). I led several battles in the markets of central Beirut, and I also organized and supervised the al-Sayfi-Burj Zarq-Tall al-Ashrafiyah sniper network. I also supervised the organization of positions all along the Damascus highway, particularly at Brumana, al-Buwayk, Ashmun and Sodeco. I received a serious wound which forced me to move to Paris. In Paris itself, I pursued my assignment by sending mercenaries to fight with the Phalange forces, receiving payments in turn as well as a commission for each mercenary, calculated on his level of skill and his physical and military readiness."

In order to sell mercenaries to the battlefield, the Lebanese Phalange set up direct access to the French Labor Youth, known throughout France and Europe for their fascism. The name of the organization was the O.A.S. Youth, or G.A.J. On Bashir al-Jumayyil's instructions, a delegation visited them. According to one of their leaders, Poulent, the delegation contacted the Paris command and met with its chief members, including Eric Poulent and Pierre Fouriois.

Poulent says, "We received the delegation, which was headed by someone called Victor, who handed me a ticket to Beirut. Pierre and I actually went to the Lebanese capital on 17 January 1976 as tourists aboard a Middle East Airlines plane. When we got to the airport, a taxi driver took us to al-Ashrafiyah, where we became soldiers the same evening we arrived, without waiting.

"We were given Simonoff rifles and taken to the hotel district of Beirut, the Regent Hotel to be exact, and then to the Hilton. Even though those fronts were quiet at the



time, we carried out storm trooper operations and organized sniper networks and barricades. After that we were transferred to the mountains, where we trained hundreds of persons and played an important part in organizing the "aquamarine port" near Juniyah—the weapons and cigars port, as we called it. I was also a French-language broadcaster for the Phalangist radio station "Voice of Lebanon," preparing news bulletins and briefs targeted at the European public. I also organized an operation to scramble the enemy's radio stations. We spent 3 months in Lebanon, after which we returned to Paris to assemble mercenary units to fight in Beirut. We began sending them to the Lebanese capital via Nicosia, in Cyprus. We were paid a salary, in addition to a commission for each mercenary we sent over."

### The French Fleet

Poulent added, "One of the contingents we sent over included specialists in explosives, mines, automatic weapons, radio, and so forth. The chief members of this contingent were Paul Fardet, Andre Baron, Philip Harteau, Floronois, DiDi Valent, and Sajit. Fardet, as a specialist officer, was the group commander. The group went to Nicosia, and 2 days later was transferred from the Cypriot capital to the port of Juniyah aboard a private yacht belonging to a Lebanese. There were 53 mercenaries in the group. They went from Juniyah to al-Ashrafiyah on troop transport trucks, surrounded by a political demonstration staged by the Phalange in an attempt to make the citizens in those areas think that the mercenaries were French paratroopers come to the rescue! They arrived in al-Ashrafiyah to great applause and welcome. The Phalange encouraged all the rumors that the French fleet had reached the shores of Lebanon and that French paratroopers had come to the rescue. Sajit told me later that the battles were very fierce."

### Like the Battle of Berlin

Here Harteau tells what happened to them. "It became clear to us that a religious center near the Rif Bank was serving as a rear guard for the battle. After we succeeded in setting fire to the bank building, the only thing we could do was to move forward amid a shower of bullets. There were bombs, RPG's, machine guns, and all sorts of street warfare weapons. It was another Battle of Berlin. It was either them or us! An RPG exploded near Fardet and injured him, so we carried him off, drenched in blood. We thought he was dead, but the war was over for him. The bank building burned down completely. The other side continued to attack in full force, using all sorts of weapons. That was our first battle in Beirut, but there were many others afterwards, and most of the members of the mercenary group were injured more than once. However, they are used to fighting. We carried out commando attacks, raids, position warfare, and wide-range operations."

Harteau adds, "One day we were supposed to seize the port of Beirut. We were successful, but only after a pitched battle. After we occupied the port, we built a big barricade, capable of withstanding 155-mm shells, across the street to the port. We stood off attacks day after day, always at dawn. During the day, we would get their 75-mm bombs and mortar shells. Our assignment, which we carried out, was to establish an axis passing through the Rif Bank, the university, the port, and the old L'ORIENT-LE JOUR newspaper building. We carried out our mission according to our agreement within 2 months, and I, Fardet, Foudois, Poulent and the others returned to Paris. The rest came later. Sajit and Floronois stayed in Lebanon and maintained contact with those sent out from Paris."

### The Tall al-Za'tar Battle

According to the mercenaries' dossiers, the new arrivals included such people as Stefan and Zantasi, who were sent to the 'Uyun al-Siman front in the Jabal al-Abyad. They also took part in the battle of Tall al-Za'tar. Zantasi says, "The Phalange held back during the Tall al-Za'tar battle, while Camille Sham'un, his militias, and the Guardians of the Cedars wanted to take Tall al-Za'tar. Thus I found myself on Camille Sham'un's side, since there was an agreement between us and the Sham'un family. We met at al-Hazmiyah, near Tall al-Za'tar, and organized a 600-man assault on the hill. On 22 June 1976, a man guided us to the area, and we then approached the hill via Jisr al-Basha. Bashir al-Jumayyil was very angry, and put pressure on Sham'un to recall the mercenary combat group. He actually succeeded in recalling Poulent and me." Here Poulent adds, "In this way, he saved our lives, because the shells and mines killed more than 40 men while they were on their way to Tall al-Za'tar."

Zantasi goes on, "After that, Sham'un and the Phalange agreed to wage the battle together, which made things easy for us. Sham'un had a mercenary, a specialist officer named Bob Trocar, an old-time British commando on whom he mainly relied."

### Historical Testimony

This piecemeal testimony is only a recounting of events—just historical facts and information. The mercenaries are not so much concerned with such things as with how much they are paid, and what kind of battle or operation they carry out. Some of them chose to fight with the right, and some with the left. In spite of the semantic difference between mercenary and ally, they have worked with just about every warring party in Lebanon.

## LIBYA

### **Social Security Agreement Signed With Malta** *45040162D Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic* 7 May 88 p 2

[Text] A social security cooperation agreement between the great Jamahiriya and Malta was signed yesterday at noon in Malta's capital, Valletta, by the Arab Libyan Director of Social Security and Dr Louis Galea, Maltese minister of social policy.

The signing ceremony was attended by members of the two Libyan Arab and Maltese delegations and the director of the Libyan Arab People's Bureau in Malta.

The protocol exempts the citizens of both countries from the retirement tax and provides for additional health and social services for their workers and joint and integrated cooperation in the field of social welfare for the handicapped, by establishing training and education programs and an exchange program for advisors and specialists with a view to eliminating all difficulties.

Dr Louis Galea alluded to the relations of friendship and cooperation between his country and the great Jamahiriya, in the social security field in particular.

In a speech he gave during the signing of the agreement yesterday noon, he said that it had been agreed to strengthen cooperation in the field of social security. The Maltese minister expressed his great appreciation for the Jamahiriya's aid and support for the people and government of Malta, saying that this agreement was a clear example of the understanding and cooperation between the two countries that are bound by relations of friendship and neighborliness.

i2502

### **Al-Qadhdhafi: Present Political Structure Facilitates Freedom** *45040162B Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic* 30 Apr 88 p 1

[Text] Yugoslav TV televised an interview with the leader of the revolution in which he talked about a number of important issues.

In his reply to a question about the triumphs and repercussions of the great September Revolution, the leader of the revolution explained in the interview that the establishment of Jamahiriyahs means liberation of the masses, and the masses mean men and women and people everywhere without discrimination on the basis of color, religion, or race.

The leader said, "This revolution which we started and whose popular bases we built between 1959 and 1960 unfortunately has been subjected to distortion and reactionary foreign intervention that have led to arbitrary

intercession to limit the freedom of those who plotted against the popular revolutionary process, thus leading to their arrest and detention. These arrests were justified and the sentences were appropriate and legal. We wanted to seize the freedoms of those who were obstructing the establishment of the Jamahiriya until the people's authority became firmly established in the popular conferences and the popular committees."

The leader added: "Therefore, there is no reason now to limit the freedom of any person in the present political framework, namely the basic popular conference and the popular committee, now that conferences and committees are found everywhere." The leader emphasized that anyone who has an opinion, a belief, a point of view, a political concept, or a political program can now get out of jail and present it to the basic popular conferences throughout the great Jamahiriya to try to persuade the people.

The leader said: "The revolution has triumphed and has succeeded in proceeding along its proper course, and its triumphs have had positive reverberation in the world. Thousands of prisoners in Tunis are being set free because I called upon all Arab governments and the whole world to shut and demolish their prisons and to set the people at liberty and respect their humanity."

The leader reaffirmed his intention to continue the struggle for the abolition of the death penalty throughout the world because this penalty is hideous and only God can give life and cause death. As for man, he must not interfere in another man's life because he did not create him and, therefore, has no right to kill him. These things are not new, but rather a triumph for the revolution's principles, goals, and intentions.

i2502

### **New Program To Exploit Fish Resources Under Study** *45040162C Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic* 5 May 88 p 3

[Text] The Popular Committee for Marine Resources held several meetings in various parts of the Jamahiriya with a view to implementing an extensive and expanded fishing plan and exploiting marine resources to meet local demand for fish at the lowest possible prices. Moreover, the committee has set up several well-organized programs, and meetings with the fishermen's associations have been held and plants set up. Also, an extensive dredging plan has been signed and officials of Libyan joint-venture companies have been asked to do their share in meeting market demand and exporting the surplus. Also, the chairman and members of the Popular Committee for Marine Resources personally oversaw the progress and implementation of these plans, and an agreement is expected to be reached to add a bulletin on marine conditions to the weather forecast, to enable fishermen and boatmen to be practical in their activities.

As part of its activities, the Popular Committee for Marine Resources is preparing a live audio-visual program on marine resources on the occasion of the beginning of the fishing season and people's participation in exploiting marine resources. AL-FAJR AL-JADID will publish a feature article about this expanded program on marine resources in its next issue.

12502

**Writer Calls for Voluntary Service To Relieve Pressure on Economy**

45040166b Tripoli AL-JAMAHIRIYAH in Arabic  
29 Apr 88 p 17

[Article: "Taking Turns for Voluntary Service"]

[Text] The concept of voluntary service is one in which members of a society decide to take the place of employees and service workers, who receive wages from society's treasury for their work, and voluntarily offer to render those services and perform production functions. Every individual would volunteer to perform a service or a public function, voluntarily, in an organized manner during the hours and days he wishes to do so. Thus, instead of having staff people depleting society's resources without providing any benefits to all members of society to carry out certain functions, volunteers, acting through an organized program, can perform these functions. Such a program would include the following, among other things:

First, people's committees in each branch of a municipality are to identify the schedules and locations of those services, showing when and where people can go to serve. The kind of volunteer service an individual wishes to perform and the specific time during which he can perform that service are to be identified.

Second, people's committees have been entrusted with the task of turning the people's decisions into programs of action.

To make it easy for volunteers to carry out this task, the services which are to be rendered are to be identified and classified, and the qualifications of those who are to carry them out are to be spelled out.

The following are among these functions:

—Guarding installations and units, service centers, and public institutions in each neighborhood. Individuals residing in each neighborhood would volunteer for such duty after the branches of a municipality are divided into popular neighborhoods.

—Office functions can be carried out by volunteers who can perform such tasks. This includes clerical work, such as issuing official papers, and general postal services. Data is to be prepared and distinctive signs are to be issued showing the kind of work which is being performed by volunteers.

—The People's Security Centers are to be controlled and operated by neighborhood residents or by residents of those neighborhoods which come under the jurisdiction of the security center or unit.

—Each municipality is to perform those functions which are required to guard the ports, public beaches, border areas, and those locations that come under its jurisdiction.

—Services for neighborhood residents, such as maintenance work on public service facilities, like water, electricity, communications, etc., are to be performed on a voluntary basis, and people are to take turns performing those services.

When citizens share all of society's resources, services rendered to citizens are essentially delivered in an organized fashion. When production, services, and security establishments and units are controlled by the people, society will have to operate, protect, and control these establishments and units in an organized fashion. Thus, those who serve as guards, sentinels, and domestics can assume positions at the sites of production so they can do something to rely on themselves in satisfying their own needs.

This means that a municipality or one of its branches would refuse to have a group of guards, sentinels, and domestics perform those services for a fee. It is a municipality's refusal, disdain, and rejection of such phenomena that will lead to their elimination.

The members of People's Congresses can utilize the sectors and organizations which make up society to organize the performance and delivery of volunteer public services. Students could take turns working in ports, handling merchandise, and unloading and loading the cargo of vessels. Or they can monitor security posts through the general monitoring units.

The various sectors would take turns, performing such services in an organized manner by means of a program which would be prepared by the people's committees and by administrative sectors and committees. They would take turns performing services which require a large number of workers.

Voluntary service is actually not just taking turns performing a service as a volunteer for which no pay or material benefit is received. It is rather something an individual does for his country and community; it is his patriotic duty as a citizen of that country, living among its citizens. An individual must be willing to offer



services and make an effort for which he will not be compensated. He must be willing to do that to preserve the continuity of a normal, social life. It is a fact that citizens do receive invaluable privileges and services for which they make no material payments.

Taking turns to perform volunteer work is one of the characteristics of an autonomous, progressive, socialist society. Taking turns to perform volunteer work leads to the cancellation of marginal positions, and that benefits society and leads to its development and progress. There are no domestic servants and no guards in a populist society.

The basic, progressive makeup and structure of society does not require the services of domestic servants, guards, and sentinels whose salaries and expenses are borne by society. The transition to a stage during which a popular state's political and economic regime can be built requires that the people's committees be aware of their role. They must pursue with earnestness the implementation of the masses' decisions, and they must make people accustomed to perform services for themselves. Otherwise, they must change the traditional service structure of society, which relies on others for service, and replace it with one that is new and productive.

08592

#### **Report Indicates Success in Meeting Housing Needs**

45040162A Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic  
30 Apr 88 p 4

[Text] The Jamahiriya housing sector has been able to meet the demand for housing units that have all the amenities of life, in keeping with the customs of the Libyan Arab family.

A recently published report by the General Planning Committee said that, in order to enable this sector to meet the various housing needs, large sums of money amounting to 2.798 billion Libyan dinars have been allocated to it at an annual spending rate of 150 million.

These huge financial investments have provided for the construction of 17,000 housing units.

Moreover, at the beginning of 1977, the housing sector witnessed significant changes in home ownership laws by regulating ownership in accordance with the Third World theory maxim that the house belongs to its dweller.

The General Planning Committee's report pointed out that the number of housing units erected nationwide are as follows:

General housing: 78,836 completed units and 39,731 units under construction.

Agricultural housing: 12,857 completed units and 1,078 under construction.

Cities and integrated villages: 5,579 completed units and 6,360 under construction.

Investment housing: 9,308 completed units and 9,422 under construction.

Public projects housing: 1,010 completed units and 2,311 under construction.

Investment bank housing: 177,479 completed units and 54,173 under construction.

12502

#### **Citizen Defines Perception of Basic Human Rights**

45040165 Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic  
2 May 88 p 1

[Article by "a Citizen": "Only a Legal Guarantee"]

[Excerpts] I have heard that the conferences will hold their emergency sessions shortly and that they may perhaps announce some things in the form of a charter, constitution, or something similar. People are saying that this charter or declaration will be something of world significance that will shake the world by the joy it will bring to the hearts of the millions of minorities, peoples, groups, and even individuals whose rights are being violated in America, Britain, and elsewhere. I have heard talk of this kind in the International Conference on Terrorism. The rights to one's own toil, self-determination, and shelter are natural and primary rights that must be guaranteed to every individual, but they are now being violated on a wide scale. I know that new things come from Libya, as Herodotus, the father of history, said.

I know that millions of Americans are without shelter. I know that the toil of workers throughout the world is taken by private companies, employers, and the government. I know that their destinies are determined by proxy. I know that parliaments are impostures and that they are worlds apart from the citizens. I know that only 30 percent of the electorate in the world votes under the best of circumstances—if the weather is good.

I know and understand all this. I often feel it and am pained by it. But to speak honestly, as a free Libyan Arab citizen, today in particular only the following things are of interest to me in any charter:

1. I want to feel certain that 'Abd-al-Salam al-Sharif will not arrest me without official permission from the office of the district attorney. I am not against being arrested if I have committed a crime. I am only against the previous method of arrest. If I am accused—"Nor do I absolve my own self of blame: the human soul is certainly prone to

evil" (Surah 12:53)—I should be arrested in broad daylight by an agency recognized by the law and by me. There should be an official signed report of proceedings, and my family should be able to witness my arrest and the charges brought against me.

2. I want to feel certain that Fatimah will not gather her colleagues in the college and hold with them a court that God has given no authority to try me.

3. I want to feel certain that my family will visit me, know the place of my arrest or imprisonment—or even the scheduled time of my execution, if I deserve to be executed.

4. I want to feel certain that if I bring a complaint against anyone, it will receive serious attention and that justice will run its course, with no distinction between Matar and Amtir, Sayf and Musa, and Abu-Qu'ayqis and Abu-Ruways.

5. I want to be certain that the People's Court is made up of just and mature people, not of Revolutionary Committee members under 25 years of age. I want to be certain that I have the right of appeal and that I am tried by a previously enacted law. I want to be sure that the People's Court is a refuge for me, that it be continuous, and not exceptional.

6. I also want to be certain that no one will intrude into my house, even when I am outside the Jamahiriyah.

7. If I am granted a licence to pursue any activity, it should not be withdrawn or cancelled, unless I violate a law.

8. I want a guarantee against a rise in prices because of recently taken measures.

9. I want to be helped by a definite agency responsible to the people, if it is desired to transform me into a producer. This agency should have the responsibility of placing means of production in my hands. If I am negligent, it should call me to account.

10. I want government taxes on automobiles, televisions, and a minimum quantity of gold to be repealed or lowered. The automobile is a necessity, not a luxury. Someone who desires a luxury car is an exception; there is nothing to prevent raising his taxes sixty fold. Television, too—because its screen is a blackboard to erase our illiteracy and to educate us. If there is any justification for trafficking in that, then it is permissible to traffic in schools. As for gold, it is not high in price, but it is sold at many times more than its price. As a result, the wealthy can buy it, but naturally not the relatively poor man in Libya. This harms the morale of the poor (relatively so, of course, in Libya), and this exorbitant tax is no compensation to him. Therefore, a small

amount representing a minimum of gold ought to be cheap and in accordance with its real price. There is nothing to prevent raising the price of anything above that to the maximum.

11. I am ready to perform 24 months of armed service to my country. If I use any deception to shirk it, have no mercy on me. But I want to feel certain that the 24 months mean 24 months in peacetime to the general staff. I want to be trained in my specialty in general military training, so that my effort does not go to waste. I want to be considered ready militarily only if it's true, because prematurity kills vitality and truth, as you have experienced.

Without doubt, human rights are the same everywhere and their victory is of interest to me. But in all honesty, what interests me most are my rights personally in Libya. I want them with a definite guarantee, not subject to stay, suspension, or cancellation, so that they are confirmed forever. Putting it in a nutshell, I only want a legal guarantee.

[Signed] A Citizen

12937

#### **Editorial Affirms Position of Revolutionary Committees**

45040166a Tripoli *AL-JAMAHIRIYAH* in Arabic  
29 Apr 88 p 3

[Article: "The Manifestation and Affirmation of Liberty"]

[Text] There are signs indicating the recent reemergence of an old phenomenon, which is a known historical fact: slavery grew and became widespread during the days of the Roman Empire. Slavery was so widespread then, that there were hundreds of slaves for every citizen of Rome. A psychological and social analysis of this phenomenon concluded that a psychological phenomenon, called "the psychology of slavery," manifested itself in the citizens of Rome and accompanied the institution of slavery. Described briefly, citizens of Rome became prisoners of the institution they had created after having lived in an environment in which they were always surrounded by a large number of slaves. Thus, they found themselves unable to act and to live their lives without their slaves, and that situation was reflected on the entire state. Production and services depended on the slaves' power and on the state's permanent ability to enslave them.

Today, slavery in the traditional sense has become extinct or almost extinct. Its essence, however, still survives. People are enslaved by those who work for ruling dictators and who surround themselves with guards, sentinels, spies, secret agents, prisons, and detention camps to guarantee the affirmation of that relationship of slavery which has become a feature of life that rulers as well as subjects share. While the power of those

who rule oppresses the subjects, those who rule dominate and govern the people through the agencies and institutions of oppression and repression with which they surrounded themselves, because they cannot imagine themselves having the upper hand and ruling without these agencies and institutions. Repressing the people thus becomes entrenched and affirmed: subjects cannot break the yoke of slavery they wear around their necks, and rulers cannot break the yoke of their dependence on the agencies and institutions they created to serve and protect them. They dread these agencies and institutions just as the people dread them.

Although freedom is the norm for people's lives and affairs, people's lives have continuously been subjected to pressures and practices whose aim is to put an end to this norm and establish one that is different from and antithetical to it. The aim is to set up a situation in which slavery is firmly established and the domination and suppression of the people is prevalent. Thus, societies which have no freedom intensify their efforts and mobilize their capabilities not only to justify the suppression of people, but also to generate by force a culture which finds injustice consistent with the real world and with requirements for development. These societies claim that human nature is inclined to conformity and subordination, and that people would voluntarily consent to giving up their freedom gradually in the interests of those institutions which, it is claimed, were founded to protect it.

That is why revolution, which essentially represents a challenge to all pressures and constraints, has always been a proclamation of freedom. Revolution is the force which can destroy these pressures and constraints and restore a normal, balanced life for people and groups. That is, revolution is the force that can restore freedom. Under the institutions of oppression and suppression, talking about rights and liberties would be meaningless. Talking about freedom would also be meaningless if those who claim they are making freedom materialize are a certain class of people with their own objectives. If the quest for freedom starts out with such a class of people, the freedom which is ultimately achieved can be nothing more than a privilege which that group of people enjoy at the expense of the rest of the people whose lives continue to be dominated by an ever changing cast of characters who dominate their lives.

Proponents of domination are always associating the concept of freedom with that of responsibility whenever they sing the praises of freedom. It's as though they found the magic word which permits them to infringe upon this concept. Thus, in the name of affirming the spirit of responsibility, whose magnitude and true nature they alone can determine, they allow themselves to take actions and measures and enact laws which would do away with whatever superficial rituals are still being practiced as forms of expressing freedom, such as the right to strike and the right to assemble and demonstrate. Other similar means of distortion and folly are also utilized.

In modern societies, as in old ones, those in dominant positions tend to follow and mimic the normal practice of individuals. They do that to maintain their dominance. They distort the tendency of individuals to have a social affiliation, which is normal, so they can promote affiliation with parties and classes. They distort convention and religion in favor of man-made laws and conventions. They distort the impulse which moves individuals to satisfy their own needs so they can promote monopolies, exploitation, and takeovers. To make the presence of suppression normal, they try to bring its material and moral manifestations closer to matters which are normal and sacred in the life of society. Laws, institutions of government, and the tools of economic and social suppression, which are the phenomena of today's world, are falsely attributed to people and their wishes. In fact, they are tantamount to those idols which were placed around the Holy Ka'bah before the conquest. These idols had nothing to do with the Ka'bah, and their presence in its proximity did not bestow upon them any sanctity. However, the aim of approximating the material and moral manifestations of suppression is to suggest that something which is not sacred is. Its aim is to ask people to yield to those who are not worthy of being yielded to.

Thus, the destruction of idols, of institutions of government, of prisons and of employer-employee relationships is a normal precursor to freedom in any true revolutionary action whose aim is the liberation and emancipation of man.

And yet, all this affords us nothing more than access to the long road to freedom which is paved by those who seek it and strive for it. Destroying the vital, material assets of the institutions of suppression is not enough to achieve the ultimate manifestation of freedom. Instead, popular action must lead to the creation of a new culture and a new environment for freedom. Without popular action, culture becomes a meaningless and superficial ritual. It is action which creates culture and at the same time gives it concrete form. When action is taken by the free masses, the culture which springs forth therefrom is most certainly that of the free masses which leads to the creation of popular glory.

To affirm the model of a populist state in Arab Libya, the ongoing revolutionary mission that must be carried out in a world where misery, hardship, despotism, and suppression prevail, is that of manifesting the freedom of the masses and making that freedom firmly established in a manner which would forever affirm the supremacy of the popular masses and their domination over all their capabilities. The Movement of Revolutionary Committees must undertake the task of educating and motivating the masses to manifest and affirm this freedom whose real and active manifestation can only be provided by the free masses.

As they undertake to carry out their revolutionary, popular functions, the only thing revolutionary committees can affirm to the popular masses is that the manifestation of freedom is the essential step to follow the



proclamation of freedom. Although a revolutionary movement might be able to start a revolution for freedom, it cannot act on behalf of the people and give concrete form to the freedom which it was created to bring about. No one but the free masses can give true, active shape to popular freedom. No one but the free masses can protect freedom and affirm it as a permanent, popular principle for happiness and progress.

08592

## OMAN

### U.S. Aid Facilitates Expansion of Waterflood Project

44000126 Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English  
9 Jun 88 p 23

[Article: "Expansion Work on PDO Project"]

[Text] Work is under way on a major expansion of Lekhwair's pilot waterflood project in North Oman.

The U.S. \$20 million extension, which is expected to be ready by August, will add another 15 wells to the test area of the field, bringing the total number of wells to 33, according to the newspaper 'AL FAHAL' of Petroleum Development Oman.

The build-up is part of a long term plan towards developing the entire field in the 1990s by waterflood, a supplemental recovery technique that involves injecting water to maintain reservoir pressure and sweep oil towards producing wells.

The pilot scheme was started in 1984 with six injection wells, supplied by three water wells, and 12 producing wells. The go-ahead to the extension followed good results from the pilot which obtained significantly higher production rates.

The extension adds 11 more injection-wells and four producers. In addition two new water supply wells are being drilled and a new 16-inch header pipeline installed that will eventually form part of the full scale project.

During installation, international plastic lining is to be inserted into the header pipeline. It is the first time this technique has been used in Oman and the first time it has been used for 16-inch piping anywhere in the world.

The work follows a successful test performed at the request of PDO in Canada earlier this year, the paper added.

/12223

### Japan To Aid in Development of New Copper Mines

44000127b Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English  
9 Jun 88 p 11

[Text] The Japanese-Government is to help Oman in mining copper at two newly-discovered sites near Sohar.

Feasibility studies conducted by the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals show the sites at Hail al Salfil and Raka could each contain about 1.5 million tonnes of the ore.

A Japanese team will be arriving on July 1 for the signing ceremony, Director-General of Minerals Mohammed bin Hussein Qassim said in Muscat.

He said good quality copper was expected from the two places and Japanese experts would study the feasibility reports before initiating mining operations in September.

The area also held prospects for gold and silver mining, Mr Hussein Qassim added.

/12223

### Drilling of 78 New Wells Under Way at Yibal

44000127a Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English  
9 Jun 88 p 9

[Text] The drilling of 78 wells is under way at Yibal oil field, the site of Oman's first commercial find a quarter century ago.

The drilling is part of a major development project to maintain production rates into the 1990s, Petroleum Development Oman's newspaper "AL FAHAL" says.

A new gathering station, known as Yibal 'D', is to be built to handle 10,000 cubic metres of oil and water which will be pumped for dehydration.

Production at Yibal is by water flood, a method involving the injection of water into the field to maintain pressure and improve recovery.

Explaining the need for more wells, petroleum engineer Jep Brink was quoted by the magazine as saying: "As the field gets older, we are producing more and more water with the oil. So to maintain the same production level of oil we have to handle larger and larger volumes of water.

"To meet these demands, we have to drill more wells and progressively increase handling capacity."

Current production is 48,000 cubic metres a day of which half is oil. By 1992 when 78 wells will have been drilled, PDO expects to be handling 67,000 cubic metres a day of which 38 per cent will be oil. Two of the wells have already been drilled and another three are to be completed this year.

Once the gathering station is ready, a rig will work full time to meet the target of the remaining wells in just three years.

Yibal, the country's most prolific field, now has 168 producing wells and 43 water injection wells.

Yibal 'D' is coming up near the old PDO camp 10km from Yibal 'A', the first production station built in 1969. Yibal 'B' was built in 1980 and Yibal 'C' three years later.

High-pressure gas for gaslift operations is to be piped from Yibal 'A' and the new station is to be powered by a 33KV over-head line from Yibal Power Station which last year was augmented by two new 25 MW turbines that tripled output.

The power station is linked with Fahud, Saih Rawl and Saih Nihayda by two new 132KW lines.

/12223

#### **Information Minister Discusses Iran, Palestinians, PDRY**

44040247b London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
10 Jun 88 p 35

[Interview with 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Ruwas, Oman's minister of information by Zaki Shihab]

[Excerpts] The Omani Minister of Information, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad al-Ruwas, visited the British capital last week, and met with a number of officials. On the eve of his departure for London, AL-HAWADITH conducted the following interview with him:

Question: During your contacts with British officials, did you sense that they were resolved to implement the resolutions made by the United Nations, especially resolution 598, which pertains to the Iraqi-Iranian war?

Answer: I believe that the British Government still feels, and is convinced, that resolution 598—as a basic principle—should be the way to end the war in conjunction with diplomatic efforts pursued by the secretary-general of the United Nations and the permanent members of the security council to find a practical, appropriate way to implement this resolution. The subject has therefore been entrusted to diplomatic efforts. On the other hand, we will explain to others that the continuation of the war does not serve anyone's interests, even though such interests may exist in the short term. In the long-run however, war is war, and it does not benefit anyone. We

will therefore continue to emphasize the need to find a means by which to implement resolution 598 under the auspices of the United Nations.

Question: Have you received specific messages through the sultanate's channels of communication with Iran, which propose limited solutions?

Answer: In specific circumstances pertaining to diplomatic work, restricted matters should not be discussed in the open communications media. The objective is higher than a press or information scoop. We are aiming to achieve concrete results on the ground; this is what we are pursuing. We are leaving everything in its framework until the appropriate time. History is the best witness of what we are doing.

Question: As long as we are talking about the Palestinian problem, what, in your opinion, are the practical steps which must be taken to support the uprising?

Answer: It must be supported with every possible means in order for it to continue to express itself, and—at the same time and most importantly—send a direct message to the conscience of the western world, which previously used to sympathize with Israel. This sympathy was transformed, however, soon after Israel's lack of credibility was perceived. In my opinion, there will be no reaction in world public opinion as long as the uprising continues.

We in the sultanate favor Arab solidarity always. From the outset, we believed that it was necessary to allow the uprising to first express itself so that world public opinion could react to it, lest we making untimely decisions which might impose on us positions contrary to our interests. But when our Arab brothers reach a consensus on the matter, the sultanate will support them as always.

Question: The presence of the naval fleet in the Gulf has provoked, and continues to provoke different reactions. What is the position of the sultanate regarding this presence?

Answer: The sultanate was one of the first nations to call for the protection of Gulf security. In making this call, Sultan Qabus stated that Gulf security and regional security are inseparable. Unfortunately, it has taken a long time for everyone to become convinced of the credibility of this statement.

The presence of the fleet in our region reflects the concern of the international community, and that community's efforts to protect its interests based on the fact that our area contains the world's largest oil reserves. Therefore, the presence of this international fleet protects the interests of the world. In order to convince the world of this, we must safeguard our interests to the same extent to which we safeguard the interests of the

world. Then, we could request the reduction of this presence along with continued protection and security for international shipping lanes.

**Question:** Do the GCC countries have a unified position regarding this subject?

**Answer:** This subject is constantly being raised among GCC countries. It is being discussed in a deliberate manner because it is sensitive and closely connected to the lives and livelihood of people in the region. I am completely convinced that there is a unified security plan among the GCC countries. If need be, we will not hesitate to implement it.

**Question:** Has the GCC achieved the objectives for which it was founded?

**Answer:** If it had achieved the hoped for objectives it would consequently be necessary to eliminate it. I believe, however, that the council is a large framework for Gulf cooperation. It is the first, true manifestation of organized, joint action in the Gulf region. It is a civilized and progressive step which we hope will be followed by other steps in other areas under careful and intensive study, because the lapsing of many unifying steps in Arab regions has produced negative results. In my opinion, it is necessary to support cooperation among the GCC countries with care and concern. We will study the GCC's development in order to assure its necessary success.

**Question:** The sultanate's relations with the PDRY were a subject of debate, especially following the border incident and the contacts which followed it. What is the present situation?

**Answer:** Yemeni-Omani relations are brotherly. Everything that goes on between us, be it negative or positive, is a part of Arab brotherhood. We are pursuing a minimum level of trust and a good neighbor policy based on the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of others, and peaceful co-existence between countries. These matters are actually the cornerstone of cooperation with our brothers and friends in the entire world. Relations with our brothers in Yemen are based on brotherliness and mutual respect, and we are pursuing the crystallization of many common interests. Actually, many of these steps have come to fruition recently, especially last week when we exchanged ambassadors. This was a high-level, positive step which gladdened the heart of every brother, and disappointed those who do not wish us well.

#### **Government Institutes Training Program for Financial Sector Personnel**

44040247a Muscat AL-WATAN in Arabic 3 May 88 p 4

[By 'Abd-al-Sattar Khalif]

[Text] A government accounting program is being held at the general administration institute at al-Khuwayr from 22 May to 22 June 1988. The program involves 25 participants who are employees in the area of finance in the royal court administration.

This was explained by Muhammad bin Sultan al-Busa'id, the general director of the general administration, who added that the government accounting program is one of the special programs undertaken by the general administration in accordance with the pressing training needs of different units.

He stated: Following the completion of the training program for training year 1987-88 it was decided to implement this program because of its importance with regard to enhancing the competence and capabilities of employees involved in governmental accounting in different units of the royal court administration.

The director of the institute stated that the financial administration department will implement the 90-hour program, which will include an introduction to the general state budget as well as a treatment of accounting in government units and its importance. The methodology of the program will include practical applications, case studies, and discussions in which program participants will be divided into working groups tasked with dealing with a specific, practical case to be presented to the group of trainees and discussed by them. Muhammad bin Sultan stated that the program aims to develop the trainees' ability to perform accounting tasks in governmental units so that, at the completion of the program, the trainees will have mastered the basic accounting course, the use of financial records and forms, and the scientific principles used to determine the accuracy of computations.

He stated that the prerequisites which must be met by participants include having a knowledge of accounting and how accounting operations are carried out in addition to at least one year of experience in the accounting field.

Concerning the most salient contents of the program, Muhammad bin Sultan stated: The program will introduce the general state budget in accordance with the new classification. It will cover governmental accounting, and the differences between it and other types of accounting. It will also include a basic course on revenue collection, expenditures, purchasing, and standing and temporary loans.



## SYRIA

### Officials Discuss Agricultural Situation in Damascus Province

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 1 Jun 88 p 5

[By Isma'il Jaradat]

[Excerpts] The minister of agriculture, Mr Muhammad Ghabbash, and Mr 'Ali Zuyud, governor of Damascus Province, presided over a meeting in the province held to discuss the problems that plague agriculture. This meeting was attended by all concerned with this question.

At the start of the meeting the governor spoke about the vastness of the province, and the fact that it was so far-flung that it imposed a big burden on the responsible parties in offering services to the citizens in general and to our brothers the farmers in particular. From there he went on to talk about the directives being followed by the province in the area of agriculture, directives that had arisen out of the president's personal interest in the question of agriculture and concern for the land, it being land that brings goodness and gifts.

Then he spoke on the subject of the distribution of pesticides, fertilizers, and tractors, the importation of sheet metal for covering wells, and providing all that is needed for the harvest. He talked about what the farmer must do on the land after the harvest, in the sense that he must implement the agricultural plan in accordance with what has been decreed, and he referred to the role of the farm family in setting up this plan, which must be based on reality. Then he spoke about cotton growing, and about the loans granted by the Agriculture Bank for the purchase of livestock, loans for which the ceiling has been raised to 150,000 Syrian pounds, and loans for digging wells, the ceiling for which has been raised to 250,000 Syrian pounds. Many issues were discussed during the meeting.

Then the agriculture directorate presented a paper in which all problems were listed, along with proposals through which work might be pushed forward. This document stated that the total area of the province was 1,801,813 hectares distributed as follows:

- a. The first designated region, with an area of 102,398 hectares, or 5.86 percent of the total area of the province.
- b. The second designated region: 162,255 hectares, or about 9 percent of the total area.
- c. The third designated region: 112,903 hectares, or about 6.26 percent of the total area.
- d. The fourth designated region: 109,879 hectares, or about 6 percent of the total area.

e. The fifth designated region, the desert: 1,314,378 hectares, or about 72.9 percent of the total area. Of that, 267,278 hectares are arable, distributed among:

a. Irrigated lands: 71,871 hectares, or about 26.88 percent of the arable land and less than 4 percent of the total area of the province. Of that, about 28,933 are planted in trees, and 32,938 are fallow.

b. Rainfed land with 57,568 hectares, or about 31.53 percent of the arable land and about 3.19 percent of the total area of the province. Of it, 23,594 hectares are planted in trees and 33,974 are fallow.

c. Unutilized lands of 137,839 hectares, of which about 50 percent is in the desert of the "fifth designated region," and the remainder of the area is in the rest of the designated regions. Most of it is hilly land that used to be planted in crops in a primitive way using the Roman plow, and it needs to be reclaimed in order to be planted in fruit trees.

### The Agricultural Production Plan for the Current Season, 1987-1988

The irrigated fallow land under crop rotation in the province is 30,685 hectares, and the acreage under crops is 46,594 hectares. Of that, 20,763 hectares are planted in winter crops, 9922 in summer crops, and 15,909 in intensive summer and winter crops. The overall rate of intensification has been set at 152 percent, but it varies from one region to the next according to the watering capacity of the various irrigation sources, thus it is only 100 percent in the region of al-Qalamun, al-Banak, al-Qutayfay and Yabrud because of the drought occurring in the afore-mentioned region and the weakness of the watering capacity of all irrigation sources in it. The highest rate of intensification is in al-Ghawtah region, where it is 176 percent, and in the rest of the regions it varies between 130 and 158 percent.

### Most Important Problems

With respect to agricultural pesticides: the province suffers from a great shortage of agricultural pesticides, since for most of these pesticides no more than 40 percent is available of the best kinds.

With respect to agricultural machinery and spare parts: the province suffers from a big shortage of large machines, especially land reclamation equipment, and from a lack of spare parts needed for those machines, since most of the machines are old and do not serve the purpose.

Likewise, the province suffers from a big shortage of tractors, especially those needed for use in large pastures.

There is also a big shortage in the credit needed to operate the machinery (fuel, spare parts).

With respect to fertilizers: the province suffers from a big shortage in the amount of fertilizer, which has had a negative impact on the implementation of the first phases of the production plan. What distinguishes this province is that the crops are grown intensively, and therefore they need large amounts of fertilizer.

With respect to seed: the province suffers from a shortage of various seeds, especially seed potato, such that farmers received 56 percent of the prescribed quantities. Moreover, there were some varieties that grew poorly.

With respect to wages and allotments: the directorate has a problem of a shortfall in wages set in accordance with the standardized workers' law, especially for technicians (mechanics, heavy equipment operators, grafting and pruning workers).

With respect to plant nurseries: the nurseries suffer from a lack of credit to provide needed supplies, especially raffia string and other requirements (shears, grafting knives, and nylon sacks for the tree nurseries). [There is] a shortage of the machinery that the nurseries need to use.

#### With Respect to Cotton:

The acreage used for the cotton crop fell to 63 percent as of 1985, and in 1986 it was down to 21 percent because of the occurring drought and the salinization of the lands planted in cotton. In 1988 it rose to 70 percent because of an improvement in the water situation in the province.

#### With Respect to the Desert:

The problem of supplying the labor needed to work in the desert at the wages currently in effect.

The problem of getting shepherds, in view of the shortfall in the wages in effect.

The overgrazing occurring on the pastures, especially those belonging to the al-Manqurah center.

Lack of credit earmarked for the desert and desert wells.

Lack of machines, even for the police.

#### General Problems:

The difficulty in growing high-yield wheats in the first and second designated regions due to the fact that they are mountainous or hilly regions with thin soils.

A rise in the cost of modern equipment needed for irrigation: drip or sprinkler irrigation networks.

A shortage of credit needed to implement the plan.

A big shortage in the containers needed for the grain crops and fruits and vegetables.

The fragmentation of farm holdings, their small size, and the difficulty in using farm machinery.

The lack of an appropriate pricing and marketing policy, which has its impact on the implementation of the agricultural productivity plan.

Lack of financing, and the delay in the issuing of the budget.

The occurrence of frost and the tremendous damage that it did to yields.

A shortage of building materials—iron, cement—and the impact that that has on the capital plan.

A shortage of fodder and the negative impact that it has on livestock production.

The delay by the public sector companies in implementing the reclamation decreed by the plan for man-made forestation.

A shortage of oils.

Lack of permission to plant fruit trees in the dry regions of the province.

A shortage of veterinarians and veterinary supervisors, and of means of transportation for them.

A shortage of veterinary medicines.

A shortage of dams in the province, which causes a large quantity of the rain water in the province to be wasted.

A lack of organized, well-studied irrigation networks in the province, which causes a big waste of the river water.

The failure so far to enact a law on the nature of work for workers in the state.

The failure to set a ceiling on direct buying in conformity with current prices.

In view of this, the minister of agriculture promised to alleviate all problems which block the progress of agricultural work in the province.

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## TUNISIA

### Chinese Loan To Finance El Menzah Youth Center

45190071c Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French  
3 May 88 p 3

[Text] An agreement dealing with a special credit obtained by the Tunisian Government from China was signed Saturday afternoon. This loan will be used to

finance the construction of a big youth center at El Menzah VI. This is a big project of national scope conceived in the context of the policy for promoting cultural, sports and social-educational activities.

The signing ceremony was presided over by Tunisian Minister of Youth and Sports Abdelhamid Escheikh and Minister of Equipment and Housing Sadok Ben Jemaa. Signing for the PRC was its ambassador to Tunisia Mr Zhu Ying Lu.

The El Menzah VI youth center that will cover an area of 2-1/2 hectares will be composed of an administration building, 10 various social and educational activity workshops (electronics, computers, sciences and so forth), an exhibition gallery, an amphitheater, library, individual sports arenas—a semi-Olympic swimming pool and several sports grounds for tennis, baseball, etc.

5671/9604

**Foreign Affairs Minister on Relations With Libya, U.S.**

45190071b Tunis *LE MAGHREB* in French  
27 May 88 pp 12, 15-21

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Mestiri by Mocef Mahroug, Slaheddine Jouchi, Nadia Omrane and M'hammed Jaibi; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] After having recently patched things up, Tunisia and Libya have just decided, in Jerba, to enter into a new experiment in cooperation. Now, every Tunisian-Libyan experiment has up to now ended up in a disappointment. Have you any guarantees that this will not be the case this time?

[Answer] We think we created a new atmosphere on 7 November capable of giving confidence to our partners including those who had the least confidence in us because, to tell the truth, the problem of confidence between us and Libya was a mutual problem. The absence of confidence was great on both sides. Today we are in a position to inspire confidence in all our partners including the Libyans. We should exploit this opportunity. We have tried and I believe that the first results are rather positive. All the more since both sides want to avoid intrigue and adventurism. It is not a matter of unity, of a merger. It is matter of a long-term unitary task that is not bilateral in nature, consequently not strictly Tunisian-Libyan, but that is in keeping with a general Maghrebian context. And there is also an evolution on the part of Libya that is inspiring confidence in us. There was a time when Libya considered the Maghreb and the Maghrebian concept almost as an imperialist, colonialist or neo-colonialist concept. Today, Libya proclaims its membership in the Maghreb. It actually goes as far as saying that Arab unity passes through the Maghreb. We agree. We, therefore, have an opportunity and it seems to us a good one. The current is moving between President Ben Ali and Colonel Qadhafi. The two peoples feel

very close to each other. The experience of the past few months of exchanges of visits and intense trade seem to me to be promising for the two countries. Why not then make efforts? Why not take extra steps? We are truly optimistic.

[Question] But do you have guarantees?

[Answer] What guarantees can one have? The sole guarantee between states is to implement what has been decided and to try to take new steps. There will perhaps be a moment when something that has been decided on will not come about; something else should then be done instead. Never let go. On the surface, Tunisia and Libya are not in agreement and do not have the same views on all international problems. But, and this is true, both Tunisia and Libya feel themselves to be complementary as never before especially after this experience of the schism that was prejudicial to both countries.

[Question] In Jerba, Tunisia and Libya have just taken significant measures. However, similar developments were expected to be seen between Tunisia and Algeria. So, it was almost a dramatic turn of events that has just come about for public opinion...

[Answer] First of all, things were not bad with Algiers prior to 7 November, while they were very bad as far as relations with Libya were concerned. We have made a new beginning, we have revitalized something with Algeria, something that existed beforehand. And we began with Algeria because we have good relations with it. We could not start out with Libya because we did not even have relations. So, it was normal that we begin with Algeria, all the more so since it expressed a desire to develop relations beginning of 7 November. There are great prospects for developing Algerian-Tunisian relations, something that we tried to take advantage of to the maximum in all fields of endeavor: commercial, economic and, even more, political dialogue if possible. We have consulted each other on Arab problems, on some African problems and we can, we must and we will consult each other more on international problems. So, things are moving along normally with Algeria.

With Libya, the configuration of Tunisian and Libyan economies is different. There is more evident complementarity. There is a possibility for Tunisians to work in Libya, something that has no equivalent in Algeria. There are possibilities for selling certain goods to Libya that does not have any equivalent in Algeria. Experiences are, therefore, different but encouragement is absolutely common. What is spectacular with Libya is the comparison with the pre-7 November days. Prior to 7 November it was the abyss, now cooperation is coming back.

[Question] Have you any guarantees on the closing of training camps—military ones—for Tunisians in Libya?



[Answer] The word "guarantee" does not have meaning in international relations. Guarantees with regard to whom? Who will guarantee the guarantee? As for ourselves, we have confidence that the Libyans are moving forward to closing these camps and perhaps these camps have already been closed. There are promising signs that this question will be resolved in the best fashion.

[Question] The question of relations with the United States is among the international issues on which Tunisian and Libyan views are different. The United States began showing some irritation some months ago over the Tunisian-Libyan rapprochement. How will Tunisia be able to reconcile its strategic relations with the United States and its relations with Libya?

[Answer] Tunisia is an independent country. The Tunisia of 7 November is a country more than ever independent. The Tunisia of 7 November pursues, within the context of its independence, its interests, the interests of its people. The interest of our people is to have good relations with Libya. The interest of our people is to have proper and good relations with the United States. We pursue these two goals. For us, there is no contradiction of terms. If there is a contradiction for someone we cannot do anything about it. Our objective: the interests of the Tunisian people. We do not see any complete major incompatibility between these two ways of action. We do not accept that Libya impose on us special or specific relations with the United States. We do not accept that the United States impose on us specific relations with Libya, Algeria or anyone else whatsoever. The fact, moreover, that our relations with the PLO, for example, irritates a lot of people has changed nothing.

[Question] It is known that of the leaders of the Maghreb countries, King Hassan II was the one who reacted to the meeting between President Ben Ali and Colonel Qadhafi in Jerba much more quickly and positively. However, Algeria did not react in kind. How can this silence be interpreted?

[Answer] It is not silence. The Jerba meeting took place less than 24 hours ago. Algeria expended a lot to bring Tunisia and Libya together. I do not believe that Algeria sees in this any disadvantage. To the contrary. I believe that Algeria perhaps feels that it did what it had to do. Whereas we have not had much reaction from Morocco up to that point. King Hassan II's spontaneous reaction was very much appreciated by President Ben Ali and I suppose by Colonel Qadhafi.

[Question] Did the interview granted by President Ben Ali to the Egyptian ambassador before the Jerba meeting have any connection with the Ben Ali-Qadhafi summit?

[Answer] No. It is linked to our president's trip to Addis Ababa who is to attend the OAU summit there.

[Question] Some observers say that Colonel Qadhafi allegedly tried to convince President Ben Ali to agree to "unity-merger" but the Tunisian chief of state refused. Is this true?

[Answer] We have refused nothing because we have never been confronted with a clear "unity-merger" proposal or any other formula of that kind. What we do note is that the Libyans are presently as convinced as we are that any unitary process must take place by stages. And we did not have much trouble asking and explaining to the Libyans to proceed by stages, studies and committees. We have, for example, talked about a common identity card. What does that mean? We are going to define it shortly within the context of a committee. Of course, it will be both common and different. This is so because a Tunisian identity card that allows you to register the birth of your son at the municipal building, for example, cannot be the same as the one Libyans will have. Nevertheless, the cards will have the same format, for example, contain the same information and open the way for exchanges between the two countries. All of these things will be decided by committees. What was decided on last Sunday in Jerba did not form the subject of written agreements but were principles that were drawn up by the two chiefs of state and that provided a stimulus to the foreign policy of the two countries. It is now up to the two ministers of foreign affairs, together with other departments, to draw up implementation measures. The Libyans understand this. I would go further by saying the Libyans demand that. So, we now have to do with a new Libya.

[Question] Has the "Jerba Treaty" page been definitely turned?

[Answer] I think that is evident. If we were still at the "unity-merger" talking stage we would not have managed to talk about a common identity card.

[Question] It appears that the Libyans are ready to put only a small portion—5 percent—of the continental shelf for joint exploitation.

[Answer] Our perception of the continental shelf exploitation is, I must say, egalitarian. For us, it is a matter of exploiting the continental shelf jointly, while 5 percent or 10 percent does not make sense. The Libyans had never said that. We are not about to make calculations in quotas and percentages. For us, it is a matter of general philosophy: either we go about joint exploitation or we do not do it. We can do without it and continue to have very good relations. But we do want to do it and we feel that the Libyans want to do it. The problem is to find the technical and economic means and to make the political decision.

That should come at a later stage. This issue has already waited for years now and can still wait a few months. Our approach, Tunisians and Libyans, is pragmatic. It is not an approach, neither from one side or the other, of

everything or nothing. If there would be partial Libyan proposals forthcoming we will listen. Even for us the general philosophy is the community, both as regards Tunisian-Libyan relations and inter-Maghreb relations.

[Question] At the time of the signing of the "Treaty of Fraternity and Concord" in March 1983 by Tunisia and Algeria, it was announced that the problem of the frontier layout had been definitely resolved. Now, 5 years later it seems that the Tunisian-Algerian frontier still presents a problem at certain points and that its layout is not as definitive as was being said. What is the situation exactly?

[Answer] The frontier problem has been resolved. There is a technical demarcation problem that we are going to settle. The political will on both sides is clear. There are at times delays, verifications to be made on the ground but there is no hesitation on the fact that we should succeed. Presidents Ben Ali and Benjehid decided on that when they met in Algiers. I was a witness to that. They said, "We are going to settle this problem." These technical difficulties are only technical difficulties. They are also at time new ideas for possible compensation because the frontier, such as it is and such as it is recognized, could wrong such and such part of a Tunisian or Algerian population or tribe. At any rate, general equilibrium exists and the vision according to which we are going to resolve this problem exists.

[Question] Can one expect a time limit at the end of which this matter would definitely be concluded?

[Answer] We would like to have it done as quickly as possible. We have the impression that the Algerians too are as much in a hurry as we are. This should occur before the end of the year.

[Question] A few years ago the Algerians proposed linking the Chott El Jerid to the Mediterranean by a canal, something that would permit them transiting part of their goods by this canal. What is the status of this project?

[Answer] We have put this issue aside for the time being. Preliminary studies are not positive in nature. The project would cost a lot, it is technically difficult to achieve and its effects on the environment are not clear.

[Question] But is the political background of the project still positive?

[Answer] Of course. If there is interest in carrying out the project there is no problem. The problem that is faced is a technical one. Besides, people who have studied the project are neither Tunisian nor Algerian. They are foreign experts who prepared a study that our own experts subsequently examined to come to the conclusion that the project is not appropriate for the moment.

[Question] There are rumors from time to time that refer to some irritation on the part of Algeria because of the democratic orientation in progress in Tunisia. Do you have this feeling?

[Answer] Not really. In any case, the Algerians have never shared such a position. From the outset, the Maghreb concept was formulated on the a priori basis that we must accept our respective regimes as they are: the Moroccan monarchy, the Algerian socialist regime, the Tunisian republic such as it is and the Jamahiriya that, with its specificities, does not resemble any other. And we have said, "If, at first, we are going to unify the systems then that risks taking us several centuries." We have, therefore, preferred putting this question between parentheses. The Moroccan specificity requires that the Moroccan regime be a monarchy, just as the Libyan specificity perhaps requires that the Libyan regime be a Jamahiriya.

Irritated, not irritated? I do not know if there are individuals who like or do not like that. We take the Algerian regime as it is. We find that it is good and that it works with us as it should. We take the Libyan regime as it is. If, one day, Colonel Qadhafi proposes to us a Jamahiriya we will listen to him with a sympathetic ear and we will propose our pluralistic democracy. But the debate is open. Perhaps one day we will talk about that. But we are far from considering that either as a prerequisite or a priority.

[Question] Yes, this is the Tunisian position but one may ask if that is also the position of Tunisia's other partners. One may also ask, for example, how does it happen that Algerian newspapers are sold in Tunisia while Tunisian newspapers are not sold in Algeria?

[Answer] Tunisian newspapers must be sold in Algeria and Libya as well as in all regions of the Maghreb. However, there are things in Tunisian newspapers that only this type of government is ready to accept. In any case, as minister of foreign affairs we will do everything so that Tunisian newspapers—all Tunisian newspapers without exception—can have access to other Maghreb markets. If we want a Maghreb there must be a Maghreb of ideas and ideas must be able to reach everybody. We are not afraid to ask that.

[Question] For many long years there has been an exchange of visits between Morocco and Tunisia on the ministerial and prime minister level but never on any higher level. Can we envisage, following the changes in Tunisia, a visit by President Ben Ali to Morocco and King Hassan II to Tunisia?

[Answer] Yes, of course. Before 7 November, the former president was not in condition to move about easily. Neither does King Hassan II get around easily because he is a king. However, today we should envisage an exchange of visits between His Majesty King Hassan II and President Ben Ali. They have exchanged telephone

calls. They have not had a chance to meet but I am convinced that there is a desire on both sides to see one another and to talk about the common interests of the region.

[Question] It seems that half an hour before the voting, the United States intended to veto the resolution put forward before the Security Council following the assassination of Abu Jihad. It finally abstained. How can one explain this American attitude?

[Answer] First of all, in my opinion it was difficult for the United States to cast a veto vote because of its relations with Tunisia and because it had already had recourse to a veto on four different occasions. Also, the United States is in an election year and the Republican administration is concerned about bringing about conditions for the success of Vice President George Bush. Finally, the Zionist lobby is a powerful one. We wanted the vote in the Security Council to take place on Friday or Saturday. The vote was put off until Monday, giving time to the Zionist lobby to exert pressure. At noon Monday, the time of the voting arrived but the American representative asked for a half hour delay because he had not yet received instructions on what attitude he was to observe during the voting.

As for us, without any threats and with complete calmness, we told the Americans, "We have good relations founded on reasonable interests. You should take that into consideration. We take your attitude into consideration. If it is positive our attitude will also be so and if it is negative ours will be the same." We did not make a threat because threats are the weapon of the weak.

Our relations with the United States are not founded on feelings alone but are above all founded on common interests and a real and old friendship that we perhaps inherited from a particular situation but one that is a reality.

The Americans took all of this into consideration—and I do not know if they consulted a computer or not—and came to the conclusion that it would be to their interests to abstain from voting on the resolution and they could then say to their "other friends that in the long run Great Britain and France, also friends of Israel, voted but we (the United States), your true friends, abstained." We consider that a positive step. This is proof that the United States attributes importance to Tunisia, to its interests with Tunisia and to Tunisia's interests with it more than it attributes to other Arab countries close to it and against which—Lebanon, for example—it has not hesitated in having recourse to a veto.

The Americans perhaps also took into consideration the fact that Tunisia presently has a strong president and government. However, the most important fact is perhaps the text—that I advise you to read—of the declaration made by the American representative before the

Security Council. To hear him speak one had the impression that he was going to vote in our favor. He thus put Israel and Palestine on the same footing since he spoke of "two peoples," "two realities." And this was the first time that that has happened since the Americans have had the habit of speaking about the "undisguised reality" that is Israel and of the Palestinians who are considered refugees.

[Question] Following the Israeli attack on Hamman Chott the Security Council ordered Israel to pay the Tunisian Government reparations amounting to close to 6 million dollars. Were these reparations ever paid?

[Answer] The amount to be paid was not determined. To accomplish this negotiations with Israel are necessary.

[Question] Your predecessor was asked one day how he was going to go about obtaining the reparations if Tunisia was going to negotiate with Israel. He answered, "Trust us."

[Answer] By asking for reparations our goal was not to obtain a sum of money. Tunisia's territorial integrity does not have a price. We wanted to have aggression recognized and established. Now, according to UN regulations, aggression is established from the moment one talks about right to reparations. That said, I will not say that the Israelis pestered us but it was not far from that. Some of us had for a moment imagined that we could, through the intermediary of the Americans, have a certain amount of U.S. aid to Israel deducted with that amount going to Tunisia. However, that was not a dignified thing to do.

[Question] You came into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the time it was headed by the late Mongi Slim. Has there been continuity or change in Tunisia's foreign policy since 7 November.

[Answer] Adhering to the same constants and same principles, we have, since 7 November, been conducting a more dynamic policy. The word dynamic is an easy word. What does it mean? A dynamic policy means a policy of initiative. And what does the latter mean? It is a policy of calculated risk, of course. This is an enormous change. We are less prudent on certain aspects that we passed over in silence in the past. From a theoretical aspect the difference is not great. From a practical aspect it is real and deep.

[Question] Does the president of the republic grant freedom of action to the minister of foreign affairs?

[Answer] We must, first of all, distinguish between foreign policy and diplomacy. Foreign policy, which consists in deciding on broad positions, comes, according to the constitution, under the jurisdiction of the chief of state exclusively. Diplomacy is the implementation of foreign policy that the chief of state decides on. Within this context the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is quite free



to act. It refers to the chief of state when the essence of foreign policy is in question. In reality, and given the fact that I am a member of the RCD political bureau and that I see the chief of state once to three times a week, I consult him on everything that I am doing in foreign policy under his impetus.

[Question] Were you surprised by 7 November?

[Answer] Everybody felt and thought that things had to change. How were they going to change? Nobody knew. Everybody was afraid because it was not known toward what we were heading. Every change is not always to the better. The worst is never to be ruled out. There were moments when every day one expected the worst. Whenever it was said that there was a change one said, "May God protect us. What's happened?" The change fortunately came about not only for the better but also in the way it did come about. I talked about this with opposition officials including high-ranking ones in the MDS [Movement of Socialist Democrats]. They did not hide their satisfaction and perceived in the change the expression of the will of God. They wanted a pluralistic democracy, we have a pluralistic democracy. They wanted human rights, they have human rights. They wanted a state of law, they have a state of law. They wanted a Maghreb foreign policy. All of that had the appearance of a dream. Immediately after 7 November people were telling themselves that if in 5 years only half of the program contained in the 7 November declaration were achieved it would be magnificent. And I must say—not only because I am a member of the government—that at the end of 6 months we have achieved more than half.

[Question] Besides your position as minister, you are also a member of the political bureau. But despite this you are perceived more as a diplomat than a politician and this in spite of a certain commitment on your part, particularly in the form of an editorial you wrote after the partial legislative elections of 24 January last. What kind of feelings does this inspire in you?

[Answer] Diplomatic functions are so intrusive that they leave no time for one to act as he would like on the domestic front. People forget and I had to correct newspapers quickly because I saw that when I became a member of the political bureau all the details of my diplomatic career were brought out but no one said that this career began with Destourian responsibilities. I began this diplomatic career because Mongi Slim was looking for somebody to go with him to Washington. He called Hedi Baccouche who was then secretary general of the Federation of France and asked him, "Do you have a Destourian to accompany me?" He answered, "Yes, Mahmoud Mestiri. I vouch for him. He is a Destourian, a true one." At that time I was a political science specialist in European affairs. I began, therefore, by being a Destourian. I never ceased being one. Each time I returned to Tunisia I assumed responsibilities in the

party. I was a member of the Tunis and suburbs coordination committee at the time of Mohamed Salah Belhaj. I was elected member of the municipal council. Destourians of my own age and those older than I am know me well.

[Question] What did "being Destourian" mean then?

[Answer] That meant being a nationalist and a patriot.

[Question] And now?

[Answer] At the moment, for me, that signifies a choice of society. A society as we hope for: free, democratic pluralistic.

[Question] And several days prior to 7 November?

[Answer] Several days before 7 November I was kept out of things. I was a civil servant through my worthy predecessor because I did not conform with....

Since the age of 16 and up to now I never ceased being a Destourian. I have enthusiastically been one up to the point of risking death, then I was less and less and at the end I no longer knew if I had been one. But on 7 November I resumed being one.

[Question] Have you ever thought of resigning and rejoining the opposition ranks?

[Answer] I never thought of rejoining the opposition and even though these opposition groups are close to us—because in these groups one finds persons who fought with us or rather it was I who fought alongside them—as Destourians. But I thought of distancing myself as much as possible. After the departure of some of my friends, "Mohamed Salah Belhaj and Sadok Ben Jomaa," I too became estranged somewhat. Nevertheless, they continued sending me my membership card. Sometimes I even received them from several party cells all at one time including the Destourian cell of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I did not, therefore, think of rejoining the opposition because I feel that I belong to this party with all its defects and problems. The party, moreover, was one of the first victims of the situation that prevailed before 7 November.

[Question] Don't you think that it is in the interests of the chief of state that he dissociate himself somewhat from the RCD?

[Answer] I think that the chief of state has already done that. As for me, I think that the president has already adopted such an attitude and consults independent officials as those of the opposition on all questions just as if the opposition were represented in the Chamber of Deputies. It even happens that the president takes their opinions into consideration.

[Question] You spoke a while ago about Destourian fringes that have left the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] after having been an integral part of the historic Destourian movement. Do you think that we must envisage their return to the RCD or that they establish an electoral alliance or yet still that a majority bringing together the big Destourian family might see the light of day in parliament?

[Answer] As an official of the RCD I cannot take a personal position. But I do think that the RCD must bring together the maximum of persons who had gathered together under the Destourian concept such as it is today in the new era inaugurated by 7 November.

That does not prevent officials who are close to us from continuing to fight in opposition parties and that they be represented in the Chamber of Deputies. They could share our principal choices while still disagreeing with us on certain others, as, for example, legalization or not of new political parties. Of course, on condition that representatives of these parties can be elected to the Chamber of Deputies. Sometimes we have the feeling that we are being asked to assure the election of some opposition officials.

We feel that all opposition is a healthy thing especially if we have the same national objectives, the 7 November principles in common. Everybody says they are in favor of the 7 November principles. We hope so. There are, however, people everywhere who do not have democratic tendencies. I hope there are none in our country. And even if there are we are ready to fight them. Our choice is a difficult one but we are convinced that the Tunisian people have arrived at a degree of maturity where it is possible to achieve this objective. Also, perhaps that risks—as one among us had said—worrying certain people in our region.

[Question] There is more and more talk about the establishment of a "presidential majority." What do you think of that?

[Answer] As a RCD member I tell you that the only presidential majority is the RCD. It is the presidential majority and it exists. Of course, if the president should decide that other parties offer required conditions so that he can use them he may constitutionally do so. He is the president of the republic and the president of the RCD. It is possible that his former position dominates the latter. As an RCD official I accept that.

[Question] And what about a government of national unity?

[Answer] Ordinarily a government of national unity is formed to get a majority in parliament. And since I do have the majority why would you want me to make a government of national unity?

I myself will not talk about a government of national unity but rather opening the doors to other parties. I do not see any disadvantage to that if the president of the republic wants it so. Especially if a difficult economic crisis or something like that arises. In that case the broadening of the base would be more in order.

[Question] Doesn't the present economic situation appear to you to be a difficult one?

[Answer] No. Of course, we would have liked the economic situation to be better. The social situation is also susceptible to improvement. Conditions for resolving the economic and social crisis are growing more and more each day.

[Question] The RCD is in the process of coopting various personalities and tendencies. Could this end up in the establishment of organized tendencies within the RCD?

[Answer] Organized tendencies, I don't think so. When we created the RCD and called it the "Rally," certain people in the opposition—including the communists—said that it was a means to become a single party. This is not the case. We have, certainly, become a rally—with tendencies more to the Left with others more to the Right—but as a whole we are still a party because objectives are clear. The 7 November declaration is clear on this subject. The congress will make these objectives even clearer.

[Question] Leftist personalities who have feelings and a culture different from that of Destourians recently found themselves back in the RCD....

[Answer] They did not find themselves back in the RCD. They joined it!

[Question] Yes, they joined. How could they become integrated in it?

[Answer] It is a question of choice. Let us take the example of our brother Hammouda Ben Siam who whose feelings were different from ours. Then little by little.... It is not easy to belong to a party because one must be disciplined. Discipline is the fact of conforming to the majority opinion. It requires a great effort on the part of the militant. I hope that the brothers who have come to us and who belong to tendencies of the Left would be respectful of democracy within the party—the first condition for the success of democracy in the country. Whoever belongs to the RCD had to be drawn by something. I feel that the majority of new members consider that the RCD is as a whole acceptable save for its views on such a such other area more rightist than necessary.

[Question] The MTI [Islamic Tendency Movement] issue is still an open one. What is, in your opinion, the most appropriate organizational formula?

[Answer] It is difficult in a country like Tunisia to accept that a party can take advantage of and monopolize the Islamic issue that is the foundation itself of society. If you proclaim yourself an Islamic party and I proclaim myself a socialist party it is evident that in every instance you will have more voters than I would. Or else, it is decided that all parties would carry the Islamic label: Islamic Socialist Party, Destourian Islamic Party, and so forth. In Europe, the situation is different. Three-quarters of the people say they are atheist. Sometimes the fact of proclaiming yourself a Christian Democrat helps you obtain votes but it could also help you lose others. Here, we are in an Islamic society where each person declares himself to be a Muslim. In any case, I found myself in the presence of communists at the Zitouna Mosque the day the president went there and really I liked that. The fact of saying that a party must not take advantage of a race, religion or a region is, therefore, very important. Imagine, if you will, that a southern party is established, we almost did so at one time with the leagues.

Perhaps our society will evolve in 50 years in a way that would tolerate an Islamic party. If, for example, they proclaimed themselves a "party for polygamy"—in a manner of speaking—it would be accepted.

[Question] We are following what is happening in the Sudan with a lot of interest. The last elections brought into the government ministers of the Islamic National Front because without this party it could not get a majority. Can one imagine ever seeing MTI representatives—organized in a manner that would be agreeable to them—being elected to the Chamber of Deputies and enter the government?

[Answer] We are playing the game of democracy to the hilt without restrictions and without ulterior motives. We try to put up guardrails so that disagreeable surprises might not await us. Presently—this is an evaluation that I am making of Tunisian society today—there is not in Tunisia a majority of people who want Islamic law of the Middle Ages re-established: cutting off the hand of a thief, stoning of an adulterer and so forth. I am quite afraid that there are not many Tunisians at this moment... We have, therefore, put up guardrails not to establish a directed democracy as has been done by some but a democracy that evolves normally toward a form completely open when society would be able to digest this sort of democracy. Presently, elections open to all tendencies will not clear a way to a "majority a la Sudanese." I think that with regard to the Islamists that it is a matter of an active minority that wants power and when it does get it it will leave any freedom and will not accept democracy. There is a basic concept that says one must not open democracy to the enemies of democracy or give freedom to the enemies of freedom. We refuse even that. But we do not agree that a minority can monopolize power in the name of Islam.

[Question] If the MTI will not be authorized to set itself up as a party, to what will it have a right?

[Answer] Let them join the RCD in order to defend their Islamic ideas or let them join the communist party or any other party. Besides, they have begun to do so.

[Question] Aren't you afraid that by doing so their speeches would be taken up by various parties?

[Answer] We believe that their number and their speeches are not so important because their movements and the noise they make surpasses their real weight. We are in a reasonable Islamic state. Since 7 November, the Islamic religion is respected. That is sufficient for a Tunisian. But the one who calls for more has political intentions and his treatment must be political.

[Question] You said that the Tunisian state has been Islamic since 7 November. Does that mean that it has renounced secularity?

[Answer] Islam is secular. Secularity contrasts with clericalism. In Islam there is no pope. As for them, they claim and would like to become popes and it is for that reason that we must combat them. And as for us, we claim that they are enemies of Islam. They have an emir; he would subsequently become a "hojetelislam"; then Ayatollah. I do not acknowledge that they have a right to give me a good Muslim certificate. That is something between me and God.

[Question] Some feel that stress put on religion since 7 November is a concession by the state to the MTI.

[Answer] I believe that it was the MTI members themselves who wanted to see in the measures decided on by President Ben Ali something that satisfied them to prove that they won and that 7 November is in a certain way a victory for them. This is a political maneuver. But, in reality, there was a situation, prior to 7 November, in which Islam was not taken into consideration. President Ben Ali restored consideration to it.

[Question] What is the status of relations with Iran?

[Answer] The Tunisian position vis-a-vis Iran is more finely shaded. We do not feel that the war between Iran and Iraq is a war between Shi'ites and Sunnis or between Arabs and Iranians. We feel that it is a regional war stemming from regional interests. We consider that Iraq is in favor of peace, something that Iran refuses. We are not, however, enemies of Iran.

[Question] But Iran considers that it had been attacked at the beginning of the war.

[Answer] The Iranians had already said so but that does not prevent them from accepting peace and setting their conditions afterward. At a given moment they asked for reparations and certain Arabs declared themselves ready to pay. But it is clear that they were putting forth this story of aggression only to refuse peace. Our sole problem with Iran is that we want them to accept peace if



only for the principle of peace. At any rate, we are continuing to have dialogues with them and we do so whenever the occasion presents itself.

[Question] Is the fact that you are a Tunis man an asset or on the contrary a handicap?

[Answer] Neither one or the other. All the more so since I am a Tunis man of very old stock and at the same time—as my name indicates—of Monastir origin.

[Question] As minister of foreign affairs, does it ever happen that you consult your predecessors?

[Answer] Up to now this has not happened. But I will not deprive myself of the opportunity if the occasion came up. My problem is that I am a professional and perhaps the most professional—this because of my long career in the ministry and not because of my wisdom—of all ministers of foreign affairs who have preceded me.

[Question] Do you see yourself in another ministry?

[Answer] No.

5671/9604

#### **Construction Materials for Libya**

45190071a Tunis LE TEMPS in French 15 May 88 p 3

[Text] Discussions between Tunisian and Libyan businessmen with regard to the supplying of construction materials have reached an advanced stage. Tunisian industrialists have been requested to export to Libya 930,000 square meters of faience and 700,000 linear meters of baseboard.

Moreover, 360,000 tons of bricks will be exported to the Libyan market. Finally, a tender of 1 million square meters of tiles has been made by Libyan importers.

5671/9604

#### **PUP Official Discusses Party Autonomy Within Presidential Majority**

45190070a Tunis LE MAGHREB in French  
20 May 88 pp 15-21

[Interview with Popular Unity Party Secretary General Mohammed Bel Haj Amor by M'hamed Jaibi; date and place not given]

[Text] Just a few days after the arrival of Mr Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Carthage, a rumor began to circulate from living room to living room, and then from cafe to cafe in Tunis, eventually reaching the man in the street. A government was said to be forming in which opposition leaders would be included. Names have even been mentioned, and for the first time, there is talk of a presidential majority.

The fact is that when by means of the 7 November declaration and the major speeches confirming it and setting forth the guidelines, President Ben Ali decreed the beginning of democracy, he was reiterating the very basis of the discourse with the democratic opposition. Ascribing hardly laudable intentions to the new president in a confused fashion, certain opponents then suspected him of wanting to "cut the ground from under the feet" of the other political forces, and this was immediately taken up, moreover, by 6 November-style Destourians who were not much inclined toward a multiparty system. But as the weeks elapsed, President Ben Ali's determination, if not obsession with, a guarantee of real democracy convinced everyone in the end.

This move by President Ben Ali was the result of an evaluation of the old system. The single party, even if a seasoned one, lay at the base of the crisis which struck Tunisian society, with the serious consequences which are still being felt today. The interweaving of the influences and interests associated with the Destourian state were such that a challenge, reconsideration or even a simple objective assessment had become impossible. This and many other anomalies created by the system had in the end resulted in an impasse, particularly in the economic and social sectors. On the popular level, it was the psychological aspect which was especially affected by the way in which things had developed. The citizens of Tunisia had in the end developed an allergy to the phrases "PSD," "Central Committee," "Political Bureau," "Coordination Committee" and "Destourian cell." This gave rise, among other things, to that insistence which came to characterize the change in the party name. But having a single party does not suffice for the organization of democratic life. The best intentions in the world are not the same thing as institutions, and no amount of desire can replace traditions, even if they are quite recent.

For paradoxically, the healthy change of direction on 7 November provided evidence, in the view of some of those on the Destourian base level, of the fact that the system was self-sufficient and that it contained within it the means of regulating itself. From another point of view, and irrefutably, 7 November provided real rejuvenation for the Destourian Party, above all after the Central Committee meeting and the change of name. Not that all of the single party's practices or its operational methods had miraculously disappeared, but the citizens, and to an extraordinary extent the cadres, no longer seemed to be blocked with regard to the RCD, as they had been in the days of Bourguiba. And thus, curiously, the signal for democratization had cleared the way for a factual unanimity which President Ben Ali seems to want to combat at all costs, convinced as he is that the same causes inevitably produce the same effects.

A presidential majority, on the other hand, would be able to take up the undeniable consensus noted in the field, without risk. This new majority, rallying different political groups around a common program and the president

of the republic, could in fact ensure a happy reconciliation between the multiparty institutions and the consensus which can, in fact, be seen today among the majority of the Tunisian citizens and the majority of the movements. It remains to be seen if this new presidential majority can, in reality, find a means of realization before the holding of the RCD congress, as Mr Bel Haj Amor says it can. If it can, there is a positive possibility that the congress of change will become a kind of constituent congress for a modern party. The fact is that sources close to the Presidency have indicated that the chief of state seems determined to have the question of the presidential majority taken up before the party congress. This is a party called upon to play an important role alongside the complex of other political groups—those which will join with the presidential majority and those which will be in the opposition. As to the PUP, it has well and truly made its choice. Let us hear from its secretary general, Bel Haj Amor.

[Question] At your request, you had an audience with the chief of state on 10 May. Following that conversation, you stated that you discussed the idea of the presidential majority with President Ali. We would like to know more about this.

[Answer] Following the various meetings I have had with the president of the republic, I must confirm that he has provided proof of his stature as a statesman, his clear-sightedness and his sense of the national interests. He is a president directing political life who is sure of his authority and, I would say, is far from being a tribal chieftain. We, for our part, encouraged him to be the chief of all the citizens of Tunisia.

Where the concept of the presidential majority is concerned, there is a point on which we would like to be clear, first of all. It has to do with the autonomy of the parties within the framework of this majority. We are an autonomous party with specific characteristics which are ours alone. We are proud of having established a party and of having participated in the establishment of the multiparty system in Tunisia. And we are not prepared to abandon this gain for which we have paid so dear. From another point of view, to a great extent we support the complex of ideas set forth by the president of the republic in his 7 November 1987 statement, and then in the various speeches which followed it, his 3 February appeal and his address to the Central Committee on 26 February 1988 in particular. We believe that to implement these principles, a broad mobilization of the patriotic forces which identify with these various statements will be necessary. Since 7 November 1987, the national recovery date, the PUP, following a profound analysis of the economic, political and social situations, and persuaded of the seriousness of the multidimensional crisis our country is experiencing and which represents a heavy burden from the past, both on the foreign and domestic levels, has never ceased to urge the patriotic forces to rally around the president of the republic, on the basis of the new guidelines, and to draft a common platform

covering all sectors. This is because we are firmly convinced that the health of our country and our true national liberation on the level of political and socioeconomic civilization cannot be achieved except within this framework. This is because we favor the change proclaimed on 7 November and want it to be irreversible, and we want opposition to the backward forces, wherever they may be found, to be possible. It is for all these reasons that we have proclaimed ourselves an integral part of the presidential majority which is beginning to take shape, and which is called upon to extend to all the patriotic forces, without exclusion. It must be far removed from all the partisan calculations which have no reason to exist in this delicate phase through which our country is passing. This presidential majority, as broad as possible in our vision, must be based, as I have already said previously, on a common platform. In my opinion, this platform should lead to the choice of a just, egalitarian and progressive model of society, and to a program for government moving in the direction of satisfaction of the aspirations of the popular masses. This presidential majority, I would even say this militant presidential majority, is in our view the sole and single voice through which our national liberation and our popular sovereignty can be made realities. It should thus be reflected in a new political dynamic, in the field and within the constitutional institutions, a dynamic which will develop on the basis of the step taken by the president of the republic to strengthen the national gains and to develop democratization. This, then, is how we see this presidential majority for the time being.

[Question] You have said that this presidential majority is beginning to take shape. We cannot see its precise outline. Can you give us some practical details?

[Answer] It is a question first of all of having all the patriotic forces in a position to play a role within the framework of this presidential majority. And it is for this reason that, where the PUP is concerned, I discussed this matter with the president during our last interview. He indicated great interest in this idea, and I think that within a very short time, we will be able to establish the practical methods for launching the process.

[Question] What are the forces which appear to you to have a profile which is suitable for this presidential majority, now and henceforth?

[Answer] In reality, I cannot say any more on this point, but I would state that where we are concerned, participation should be open to everyone, without exclusions.

[Question] Including the Islamists?

[Answer] Why not?

[Question] You said that consideration of the practical methods will begin shortly. Will this be before or after the RCD congress?

[Answer] I think that we should begin to put the practical methods of this presidential majority into use prior to the RCD congress.

[Question] Is this your personal feeling or the decision of the president of the republic?

[Answer] It is my feeling, and one which the president shares. As far as I know, and this is a secret to no one. The concept is an established one.

[Question] To recapitulate, then, the scheme would be the following: identification of the patriotic forces which may join together within the framework of the national pact; the congress of the PSD; early legislative elections; and finally, a coalition government.

[Answer] I believe that all of the decisions should be based on a platform which needs to be established first. It is a question of perfecting a common platform on the basis of which all the rest will come about, and in my opinion, once agreement has been reached on the platform, on the model of society we want to establish in Tunisia, everything will be settled.

[Question] You do not exclude, then, the possibility of a National Union government?

[Answer] You know, this is not the most important thing for us. The important thing is to draft a common platform. The implementation of this common platform will then be carried out. By whom? That is another problem. In any case, the problem has not been taken up on this level.

[Question] The National Union government seems to be the logical outcome of all of this procedure.

[Answer] It is in a second stage that this can be discussed.

[Question] Observers think that the national pact already has three actual and established partners—the RCD, MDS and PUP.

[Answer] Where the PUP is concerned, I am entirely in agreement, and of course there is no problem. But I cannot say anything about the rest, after all. However, I still say that this majority is open to all the patriotic forces which identify with the 7 November statement and the various speeches and addresses made by the president of the republic.

[Question] Where the parties which do not participate in the presidential majority are concerned, how do you see their role?

[Answer] If these parties find reasons not to participate in this presidential majority, it is for them to define their role in political life. The principle is that the door is open.

[Question] Including to the PCT?

[Answer] Including to the PCT. There should be no exclusivity.

[Question] Is it easy to draft a common platform when we take the ideological differences among the various movements into account?

[Answer] I am persuaded that we can draft a common program and a common platform, even if limited in time, in order to face up to the current crisis. A program of political and economic recovery.

[Question] But don't the Islamists still constitute a major problem?

[Answer] Where the Islamists are concerned, all I can say is that since the trial involving this movement last summer, we have not been in contact with the MTI leadership. That having been said, we continue to follow all of the events affecting them very closely, and we have heard reports of certain reactions on the part of the leaders of the MTI. Relations with this movement were maintained prior to the trial, and with its president, Rached El Ghannouchi, above all. These relations were bilateral, and also existed within the framework of the opposition parties' liaison committee. Moreover, they were based on respect for the rules of the democratic game the leaders of the MTI have always proclaimed, which denounce fanaticism and violence. We have always confirmed to the MTI leadership our rejection of any recourse to violence, which could only lead the country into an impasse and toward dictatorship, and we hope—and we are very optimistic on this point—that the new Tunisia will turn a page, and that Rached L. Ghannouchi and his comrades can regain their freedom. (Mr Bel Haj Amor granted this interview prior to the release of Rached Ghannouchi.) Thus, provided that the MTI respects its commitments and the principles it has always set forth since the period when it requested authorization for the party, we believe there is no reason for these people not to express themselves openly, because they represent a force which exists in the country. And we need its free expression, that is to say direct expression, rather than clandestine, and more particularly violent, expression.

[Question] Was it your meeting with the chief of state which made you so optimistic about the solution to the MTI problem?

[Answer] In part, yes.

[Question] Did you discuss this?

[Answer] As I told you, the president is aware of all the acute problems which exist and are a reality in the country.



[Question] This leads us to the subject of the political party law. Are you satisfied with it?

[Answer] Satisfied? I would say no. There are certainly weaknesses where this law is concerned, but I believe that we should continue to be militant and try to correct these weaknesses.

[Question] Isn't Article 6 likely to create problems for the MUP?

[Answer] We made suggestions in connection with this law, and some of them were accepted, while others were not. But we did not discuss Article 6, because it was not included in the draft which was sent to us. We are not entirely in agreement with this article, and in any case, I do not think, as some people do, that it came into existence precisely in order to censure the MUP. Moreover, I am sure that the programs of the PUP and the MUP differ in some ways, and this is why I say that there are two autonomous bodies, and that in any case, our existence will not interfere with the existence of the MUP.

[Question] How many divisions are there within the PUP?

[Answer] You know that generally speaking, the opposition has shown its potential in this connection during the various legislative elections which have been held in the country. You will agree with me that no party has been able to work in a clear and definite fashion and to evaluate its strengths in a precise and statistical manner, particularly in the interior of the republic. And the activities of the old Destourians and even the authorities have been such that there is really a barricade which is, by various means, hindering the advance of and recruiting by the opposition. means. But during the elections, the PUP has nonetheless been able, both in November 1981 or November 1986, to draft electoral slates for the first time in about 13 districts, and in eight, for the second time, in 1986. Unfortunately, we have not been able to go all the way because of the antidemocratic maneuvers and practices of that era. It was not until that time that we saw our militants and the popular support we enjoy more or less everywhere take off. I would also say that when we regain our freedom of action in the future, we will have an opportunity to assess our strength.

[Question] Do you have freedom of action now?

[Answer] We are beginning to have it, but we will soon enter into a phase of much more extensive action.

[Question] And what about the level of financing and aid?

[Answer] I think that the solution to this problem will be found in a second phase. The problem has been raised. I discussed it with the president of the republic, and he

believes it is a little premature to discuss it now. Party financing is very important, because if one wants to have autonomous parties, it will be necessary to find a means of financing them and their various organs. These parties provide leadership for a large number of citizens and they play a training and staffing role. There is no reason not to finance their activities, at least in part. Naturally, there is a problem of control, of honesty on the part of these parties and their leaders, for which provisions must be made. But we must nonetheless resolve the financing problem on the state level.

[Question] There is talk of the return of Ben Salah, who was a companion of yours in the past. What is your feeling?

[Answer] You know, where Comrade Ben Salah is concerned, and generally speaking where the MUP is concerned, if you like, it is a secret to no one that we ourselves participated in the creation of this movement in 1979. Differences developed subsequently which led us to found the PUP, but in any case, we were among the few movements to have asked that the exile of Comrade Ben Salah be ended and to ask the president to pardon him.

The PUP was very pleased by this last measure, and we are persuaded that President Ben Ali was faithful to the line he has proclaimed and acted as a rallying agent in granting a pardon to Comrade Ahmed Ben Salah. This pardon, in our opinion, comes within the context of the purging of the political atmosphere and puts an end to an injustice which had gone on too long. Where the various contacts are concerned, we do not have direct contact with the MUP, to tell the truth. Such contact as we have had has been within the framework of the committee for liaison with the rest of the opposition parties, and I must tell you that we have not avoided these contacts when they were necessary. We have no bitterness toward anyone, and time will only confirm our good will in the eyes of those who still doubt it. Thus we have been working, up to the present time, to ensure a rapprochement within the liaison committee with the rest of the political parties and the other opposition movements in order to defend individual and public freedoms in an entirely progressive spirit, and we will continue to do so.

[Question] Are you for or against Ben Salah's recovery of his political civic rights?

[Answer] We have said and proclaimed that we hope that Ben Salah, who is a sincere militant and a brave patriot, can regain all his rights, and I am convinced that he should have confidence in President Ben Ali with regard to the true recovery of all his rights.

[Question] Will you go to welcome him when he arrives in Tunisia?

[Answer] There is no reason we would not meet with him.

[Question] Does the possibility of a reunification of the PUP and the MUP exist?

[Answer] This is not on the agenda for the time being.

[Question] Does Mohamed seem to you to be particularly fascinated by President Ben Ali?

[Answer] You know, I have commented on his courage and his convictions, which have led to a change so much desired by the entire people. I have noted, since I have seen him on an average of once a month since 7 November, that he is always attentive to the problems of the citizens, to their difficulties and their objections. He is a man of conviction who knows how to make his actions consistent with his thinking. He is a man of dialogue whose sole objective is to find the honorable solution for all.

[Question] There are those who can easily see you as one of Ben Ali's ministers!

[Answer] This is not the most important thing when you are being consulted as a party about matters of national interest, and when you have an opportunity to express yourself through all the institutions.

[Question] This does not alter the fact that the political elite see you as the future minister of agriculture.

[Answer] This has never been an issue!

5157

### **New Port Enterprise To Provide Ships With Electronic Equipment**

45190070b Tunis LE TEMPS in French 30 May 88 p 3

[Excerpts] An enterprise specializing in the repair and installation of electronic apparatus (welding equipment, transmitters, receivers, etc.) has just begun operation in the port of La Goulette.

This enterprise, named the Electronic and Electrical Maritime Laboratory (LABYREME), which was organized and is directed by Mr Abdelhamid Ben Younes, a well-known figure in this field (20 years in the Navy and 5 years in the merchant marine), with the full encouragement of the authorities, makes its services available both to the vessels serving the port of La Goulette (commercial and fishing) and those based at other ports in the country. In this connection, Mr Ben Younes showed us, in his workshop, a transmitter-receiver he is repairing for a tuna vessel in Jerba.

Describing the situation in his special field in Tunisia during a brief interview, Mr Ben Younes, who is aided by two technicians, noted that there are a number of

maritime electronic engineers in Tunisia, but he said that while the enterprise is well-staffed on the theoretical level, there is, on the other hand, a shortage on the practical level in this field.

He also drew attention to the unavailability of the replacement parts needed for the repair of the apparatus in which his firm specializes. Work on equipment worth thousands of dinars is sometimes halted for lack of something costing a few hundred millimes. "But I have luckily learned to 'cook up' parts on my own and thus to get my customers moving again, to their great satisfaction," he said.

All of the difficulties mentioned are due to the shortage of replacement parts needed for the maintenance of the ferry engines. A technician who was still at his post in the ferry workshop at 5 pm last Monday, although he was scheduled to leave at 1 pm, even called this replacement part problem a "national" issue.

"We use all our ingenuity," he said, "to repair the breakdowns and the defects found, whatever it takes, but often it is more than we can do. And the citizens are unaware of all of this, or do not want to hear about it."

For example, the ferries have four engines, but in order not to deprive the customers of the free ferry service, those running the ferries, at their own risk and peril, sometimes operate them with only two engines, although it is forbidden to do so.

For all of these reasons, a single ferry has been operating recently. There are, however, three—two large ferries, the Bab Tounes and Zarzouna, and one of medium size, to which some modifications are planned in order to improve its operational capacity. Meanwhile, the problem has been posed, but it is not ill will which is the cause of it.

5157

### **UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

#### **Bank Official Says UAE Not Ready for Stock Market**

44000128 Dubayy GULF NEWS in English  
30 May 88 p 11

[Article by Barbara Jones: "Hamar Rules Out Deadline for Stock Mart"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi—The Governor of the UAE Central Bank, Abdul Malik al-Hamar has ruled out the establishment of a time-scale on the setting up of a free market in Gulf shares within the region or the establishment of a stock exchange within the UAE.

In an interview with GULF NEWS he said: "The financial markets follow, usually the progress made in the economic and financial sectors of the country. Many

aspects that are prerequisite for the proper evolution of those markets are still missing. For instance, in the UAE, a Commercial Law is still to be ratified. The Commercial Companies Law that organises the primary market in securities, though promulgated in February 1984, has not been implemented yet. These developments illustrate the difficulty of putting, or even suggesting a time scale. The socio-political factors have yet to develop appropriately to accommodate the establishment of new institutions."

A draft law concerning the organisation of a UAE securities market was prepared early in 1983 and subsequently submitted to the Ministry of Economy and Trade in May of the same year.

But in the wake of the collapse of Souk al-Manakh in Kuwait, again in 1983, the law never reached the legislative body within the UAE.

However earlier this year the Board of Directors of the Central Bank issued a decision to cover the rules and

procedures that the Central Bank requires dealers to abide by in order to obtain a licence from the Central Bank.

"For all practical purposes," said the Governor, "this may be considered a first effective step in organising the securities market. While it is necessary, it is not sufficient. However, other steps are expected to be taken by authorities other than the Central Bank."

As far as the AGCC's decision to favour a free market in Gulf shares in the region the Governor commented: "An exchange of ideas is going on in the concerned circles in GCC states about the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a pan-Gulf Stock Exchange. However such exchange has not yet reached the stage of studying the feasibility of introducing such an institution."

/12223



## AFGHANISTAN

### Kabul Transportation Problems

LD0207235588 *Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto*  
1530 GMT 2 Jul 88

[Excerpt] A Moscow city executive committee delegation arrived in Kabul yesterday from the Soviet Union to make a decision on removing the problems related to Kabul's passenger and freight transportation. According to a BAKHTAR report, the delegation met today with Kabul Mayor Muhammad Hakim in his office.

### Aid for Education

LD0507022288 *Kabul Domestic Service in Dari*  
1600 GMT 4 Jul 88

[Excerpts] The first convoy of the Soviet Union grant-in-aid for the Ministry of Education arrived in Kabul today. BAKHTAR reports that in a meeting arranged for this purpose in district No. 11 of Kabul, first deputy minister of education talked about the assistance and help of the Soviet Union in developing education. Aleksander Petrov, consular officer of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul, gave the assisted material to the deputy minister of education after delivering a speech. The material, which include teaching aids, and sports laboratory equipment for the schools of cities and provinces, were brought into the country through (Hairatan) Port.

## BANGLADESH

### Food Import Lobby Criticized

46070011 *Dhaka ROBBAR in Bengali* 22 May 88

[Article by staff writer: "In the Ongoing Fiscal Year, What Is the Real Amount of Foodstuffs Being Produced?"]

[Text] Self sufficiency in food production has been our goal since independence. It's not that food production after independence hasn't increased. Production has nearly doubled. It can be said without hesitation that dependence on others for food is the worse kind of dependence. In many ways donor countries create an environment of interference. We now look at the current fiscal year as the new one, 88-89, is about to begin.

The 87-88 production goal at first was at 17,500,000 tons. Due to the flood there was a food shortage. Immediate estimates saw a 3,480,000 ton shortage. Estimates at the beginning of the year had unavoidably foreseen a 1,478,000 ton shortage. Taking the floods damage into consideration, a nearly 3,500,000 ton shortage was forecast. On account of these observations, the government bought 1,100,000 tons of food grains. Apart from this, pressure on the government caused a plan to be undertaken for collecting an additional 2,100,000 tons.

Meanwhile, nearly 1,200,000 tons of food grains arrived in the government's hands. On account of the 3,500,000 ton shortage, the food production goal had been revised to 15,200,000 tons. In a fourth revision the goal has been set at 16,300,000 tons.

The present government has a food grain stock of 1,200,000 tons. The distribution of this, however, has been quite limited. As a result the foodstuffs have been deteriorating for a long time. This matter of concern came out in the news and the government expressed no objection about it.

Amongst the stock of foodstuffs is *atap rice* [coarse grade of rice]. Except in Sylhet and Chattagram, there is no demand for this kind of rice in our country. In spite of this, a great deal of the stock is *atap rice* which is hard to sell. This creates a special kind of problem.

The information quoted here naturally raises several questions. One of these is: At the time of the flood, while a food shortage was going on, what amount was held in stock? This affects the accuracy of the revised amount and suggests that the revision may have been rushed. It is not unnatural that this mistake resulted from the intensity of the flood, but rather natural. Apart from this, it was estimated how much production shortage the farmers would be facing. It may be assumed that it was lowered. Thus I am posing a question: If the whole country is suffering a loss, why should the small group known as the import lobby make a profit? The import lobby means those who profit from imports. They act as agents for foreign exporters by importing and assisting them. All food importers of course do not exactly receive commissions. There is no practice of giving commissions in food subsidies. Yet by using cash or in some other way, food importers keep on profiting. Since Bangladesh has been independent, there are groups which have joined with the importers. They are quite powerful. Foreign food export companies consider their recommendations important and in this way they have great influence on the government. If a food shortage is great, their imports increase and they make a windfall. Because of this, the question arises whether they overestimated the food shortage in order to increase imports. Was the 1,200,000 tons quickly imported done innocently? Again I must say that it is not unnatural that mistakes arose on account of the floods' unpredictable behavior. Yet the involvement of a handful of people in suspect food imports is enough to incite terror. The way the import lobby influences import policy, it doesn't seem there is any reason for granting them an exception in this regard. Actually this type of corruption should not be regarded as unnatural.

## IRAN

### Malakuti's Views on Majlis Elections

46400140a *Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian*  
31 Mar 88 p 3

[Text] Tabriz—ETTELA'AT Correspondent—An atmosphere must be created where the people will be able to elect freely their representatives to the third Majlis.

Ayatollah Malakuti, the Imam's representative in Azerbaijan and the Friday imam of Tabriz, explained this matter in a speech at a gathering of commanders and officials and a group of revolutionary guards from the East Azarbaijan Islamic revolutionary komiteh. He added: We must realize that all the thoughts of the people in a city are distilled in the one or several representatives they send to the Majlis, and also, since the people want to send the gist of their ideas to the Majlis, they must be free to vote for each candidate that they want.

He noted: Therefore, the Majlis and Majlis representation, due to the fact that an individual who goes to the Majlis has crystallized all our ideas in his own, occupies a very important place. According to this principle, the candidates must also observe piety and take note of why it is their wish to be elected. They must put aside their personal whims and realize that the Majlis is no place to amass wealth and acquire position. Rather, it is a place to preserve the country's dignity. Of course, the candidates must be allowed to issue propaganda and say what they have to say. Then the people themselves can choose.

9310

#### **IRI Reverses Past Practices, Authorizes Interest Payments**

46400141a London KEYHAN in Persian 30 Jun 88 p 4

[Text] On Khordad 7 [28 May] of this year, at the request of the Islamic Republic Organization of Money and Credit, the regime's general assembly of banks met and approved, without fanfare, a proposal to require the nation's banks finally to pay interest on deposits, contrary to the practice of the past few years. Until prior to the approval of this plan, the Islamic Republic had considered this a form of "usury" and a major sin, and Muslim scholars have held numerous meetings to eliminate this sin. They have even held seminars and congresses on the subject, and have driven the point home with the support of verses from the Koran and the sayings of the Prophet.

Concerning implementation, Mr Irvani, the regime's minister of finance and economic affairs—who evidently worked very hard for the approval of this regulation—announced immediately afterwards: "Henceforth, contrary to previous years, six percent will be paid on short-term deposits and 8.5 percent will be paid on long-term deposits (one year or longer)," in order thereby to regain the people's confidence in the banks and to revitalize the exhausted store of public deposits.

In general, money that an individual deposits in a bank is like rented property and assets. The institution which takes a sum of money for a fixed period of time must also pay its owner rent in return, just as a landowner rents a home and collects a monthly sum of money as rent.

Thus, the payment of a profit on money that has, so to speak, been rented, is a logical and principled thing to do which is routine throughout the entire world and standard practice for all of those who believe in a sound and fundamental economy. However, the Islamic Republic's formative shape and texture in these matters was established on 8 Shahrivar 1362 [30 August 1983] when the Majlis enacted the Bank Operations without Usury Law. This law was given the stamp of approval two days later by the Council of Guardians, and such swift action by that council was unprecedented before that date.

After the preparation of executive guidelines, this law went into effect at the beginning of the month of Farvardin, 1363 [21 March 1984], and, according to the regime's top officials, "with the implementation of this law, an important step has been taken to achieve one of the revolution's basic goals with regard to government and Islamic and divine laws."

In this law, the primary and most basic issue under consideration is the elimination of interest payments from Iran's banking system. In their place, in order to attract bank deposits from the public and prevent damage to the banking system, strange and backward solutions were provided, two examples of which were the payment of payment of premiums or the attachment of privileges to public deposits. What was actually done was the equivalent of interest payments, but different terminology and the use of religious law quieted the uproar surrounding the issue.

After the law's enactment the people, who were never able to digest these terms and metaphors—and understandably—and who essentially looked upon these commitments with suspicion and hesitation, refused to deposit money in the banks. The situation finally reached the point where a law that was approved by the Majlis with so much fanfare was reduced to a worthless scrap of paper by a few people in a meeting of several hours.

In any case, since the Islamic Republic has finally concluded that the payment of interest to depositors can still preserve the exalted laws and regulations of Islam and that this measure is in no way incompatible with "piety", it would not be a bad idea if we take a brief look at the enactments of the International Seminar on Islamic Banking held in Tehran on 21-24 Khordad 1365 [11-14 June 1986] on Banking without Usury Day, and ask ourselves, is the payment of interest by banks a service to capitalists and money hoarders that is precisely at odds with Islamic criteria? Or may one, in times of difficulty, suddenly put aside all these slogans and indoctrinations and walk the road of reason and practice?

The resolution issued by this seminar, after glorifying and praising the Islamic Republic's innovation in eliminating interest payments by banks, says: Iran's banking system was built on "usury" in the past, which is actually

the Western model of banking... The payment of interest by the banks necessarily takes them down the road of service to capitalists and money hoarders... Clearly, such value assignment was not only not in accord with the exalted commands of God, but it was precisely at odds with the Islamic criteria that regard "piety" as the highest human attribute.

In conclusion, a question worth asking is, with all its concern and its speedy approval of the Bank Operations without the Usury Law, what opinion will the Council of Guardians announce concerning Paragraph Two, Article Five of that law, which says: "Banks may not announce or pay any predetermined profit on fixed-term capital deposits"?!"

Mohammad Sattari

9310

**Millions Allocated To Aid Emigrants**  
46400140c Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
14 May 88 p 4

[Text] Bushehr—For the purpose of providing more services to emigrants from the imposed war, during the current year 600 million rials in credit will be spent on health care for these dear ones throughout the country.

The supervisor of the Emigrants of the Imposed War Affairs Foundation announced this at a press conference. He said: With the coordination that has taken place, henceforth all emigrants who have not had access to health care services may make use of the facilities at hospitals under the mantle of the social procurement organization. While noting the government's concern for the health care of emigrants, he said: This year the prime minister has ordered the allocation of 300 million rials in credit to provide health care for emigrant shanty towns, and this money will be spent in cooperation with area health care workers and the Emigrant Affairs Foundation.

The supervisor of the Emigrant Affairs Foundation discussed housing for emigrants. He said: During the last two years 20,000 parcels of urban land have been given to us for emigrant housing, of which 10,000 parcels have been turned over to emigrants.

He added: This year 6.3 billion rials in credit will also be spent on housing for emigrants.

9310

#### **Regulations To Counter Carpet Smuggling Announced**

46400140b Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
4 May 88 p 4

[Text] Tehran—ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY—The Iran Center for Export Expansion has announced decisions made by the Export Expansion Komiteh for the purpose of countering the smuggling abroad of carpets.

The Center for Export Expansion reports that during the past few years, due to the scandalous difference between the official and free market rate of exchange for the dollar, the illegal export of goods, especially luxury items and expensive goods, has expanded.

Hand-woven carpets are now the nation's most important export item, occupying first place after oil. In 1366 [21 March 1987 - 20 March 1988], Iran was the world's leading exporter of carpets with 12,000 tons of carpets valued at \$50 million. After a three-year period of stagnation from 1360 to 1362 [21 March 1981 - 20 March 1984], Iranian carpets have regained their position of prominence on the international market.

In 1987 West Germany, the largest buyer of hand-woven carpets, bought more than 1,030 million marks from various countries, the biggest part of which (35 percent) came from Iran. The value of Iran's carpet exports to West Germany during this year was more than 363 million marks. India and China exported 202 and 67 million marks respectively in carpets to Germany, ranking second and third.

Statistical studies show that first-class and preferred carpets rarely find their way through customs to export markets, and that most carpets of this type are transported across the border to neighboring countries and other points in unauthorized ways through the provinces of Hormozegan, Bushehr, Sistan va Baluchestan and Khorasan and then placed on the world's major markets. The smuggling of carpets, besides being seen as the unauthorized departure of the nation's capital and sources of foreign exchange, also damages the official export of this item, because individuals who illegally export carpets, not having any obligation to return the foreign exchange gained from carpet exports, sell them at unrealistic prices on foreign markets. Accordingly, official exporters cannot compete with them under normal conditions.

More than 90 percent of the first-class and preferred Iranian carpets are smuggled onto the world's important markets.

The Iran Center for Export Expansion stressed that in order to counter carpet smuggling it is necessary that decisive measures be taken, that the nation's border



areas be more carefully watched, and that the anti-smuggling teams of the gendarmerie and the Islamic revolutionary komitehs be strengthened at Bandar 'Abbas, Bushehr, Khorasan, and Sistan va Baluchestan.

The Komiteh to Expand Non-Petroleum Exports, which is the highest decision-making authority on export policy, has stressed the necessity of fighting carpet smuggling, and on its 2/11/1367 [1 May 1988] meeting, it proposed:

A. The smuggling of carpets should be subject to government penalties, and, if confirmed, competent authorities must specify precisely the types of penalties and their executive regulations.

B. To prevent carpet smuggling, the customs houses at Bandar 'Abbas, Bushehr, Mashhad and Sistan va Baluchestan must refrain from assessing and exporting first-class carpets.

In accordance with guidelines to be issued by Iran customs, the export of this type of carpet and the execution of their customs procedures will be done only at the customs houses of Kerman, Esfahan and Tabriz.

C. Vehicles hauling first-class carpets (on a commercial scale) in the border corridors of Bandar 'Abbas, Bushehr, Sistan va Baluchestan and Khorasan will be suspected of hauling smuggled carpets and their passage through these areas will be prevented.

It is expected that with the implementation of the above proposal, there will be a notable decrease in the smuggling of export carpets.

9310

## PAKISTAN

**White Americans Said To Hate Asians**  
46000160c Karachi DAWN in English  
10 Jun 88 (supplement) p II

[Article by Syed Tariq Mahmud: "Does America Discriminate?"]

[Text] Those Asians who are "blessed" to settle in the United States, try much to publicise among their acquaintances that as the United States is basically made up to immigrants, therefore they have equal constitutional rights of citizenship. Like the ones enjoyed by other older and new immigrants from Europe and Australia.

They claim so on the basis of Articles fourteen and fifteen in addition to the Constitution of the United States. Naively, most of them don't seem to realize that it is not only the constitutional rhetorics which matter,

but in actual practice, it is the common public, whose favourable opinions and drive may provide them with a firm guarantee for a secure future.

### Immigrant Status

A look into the multi-racial history of America, reveals that the major proportion of the American population came from different parts of Europe, time to time, constituting the white race of the continent. Those Spaniards, Dutch, English, Greeks, Italians, French, Portuguese, Germans, Scandinavians, Swiss, Austrians etc. who have been settling there for the last few centuries, claim themselves to be the actual builders of the superpower.

### Racial Tension

Now at least, as a first measure against deteriorating situation, the Asian immigrants of United States must shed their illusions. They ought to stop deceiving themselves regarding the nonbothering of hectic Americans about such "smaller" issues like races, nationalities, usurpation of employments and resources by outsiders, or the sharing of facilities and benefits with foreigners.

The growing hatred for Asians among the white race is no more a mystery. The Asian population mostly Arabs, Japanese, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, Iranians, Turks and Afghans are usually categorised as "opportunists", having no participation in the building of the nation, but sharing its benefits.

### Far-eastern Asia

The ancestral countries of the white Americans in Europe have already started to show signs of utter dislike for the people coming from "less civilized" continents. Throughout that region of the world, the land most affected by this anti-immigration drive, is not other than Great Britain, the motherland of democracy. The biased treatment meted out to the Asians, especially to "Pakis", for the last decade, has already been raised as a political issue, even inside the English Parliament.

In the eastern Asia, apart from the comparatively smaller and less-stronger states of Philippines and South Korea, the foreign office of United States has always been occupied with a keen desire of having a stronger and dominant country as a close ally. This opportunity came in the wake of the diplomatic developments between China and United States in 1971, following the ascendance of the post-Mao regime to power, with the open-door policies of China which indicated the beginning of a new era in the Sino-American relationship.

The rapid process of capitalisation cum westernization of the People's Republic of China seemed to tear away the so-called bamboo curtains, raised by their leaders to keep the communist minds away from the "evils" of the West. However, at the moment, it looks that despite

China's coolness towards Soviets, prospects for China being a reliable American friend are not bright, as United States is not prepared to take any risk of supplying high technology to a communist power. The capitalist superpower is not ignorant of the binding force an ideology can play among different geographical entities. The political cautiousness once again washed away all the hopes of healing those traumas which were deeply inflicted upon the American mind during the Vietnam, and Korean Wars.

A senior Pakistani professor at an American state university, removed my previous presumption about American people having a soft corner in their hearts for Japanese. "They are not regretful a bit for what they did to Japs in 1945", he remarked, "but instead, they are afraid of Japs' inevitable encroachments on American markets world over. It is a serious matter for Americans. It concerns their bread and butter".

Recent commercial-barriers imposed by United States upon imports from Japan, was one of the causes of this restlessness, mostly among the American and European traders.

#### Foreign Students

This internal discomfort is casting its shadows over the policies on foreign students, as well. A few years back, "The Chronicle of Higher Studies" published a comprehensive report regarding the "foreign students in American colleges and universities". In this report two university professors Mr. Goodwin and Mr. Nacht reported that "most of the college and university officials with whom we met place the foreign students low on their list of priorities". The critics of the U.S. policy on foreign students warned of "the growth of political pressures to limit or restrict foreign-student enrollment on the grounds of either national security or economic protectionism."

#### White Version

The two American professors recommended a questionnaire for the officials of American educational institutions. One of them states, "Should limits be placed upon students from particular countries and regions or on those entering certain fields?"

I discussed this matter with an outspoken, straightforward white American, visiting Pakistan to attend a seminar at Karachi University. He unhesitatingly accepted that the gulf of difference between the European and Asian immigrants is already quite wide and "probably" increasing with time. "I am not saying, at all, that the US system for citizenship is going to be a fiasco, however differences between old and new inhabitants of a land have been a regular feature, throughout the history of mankind."

He asked me inquisitively, "What would be your feelings if nationals of poorer countries like those of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal etc. are allowed to settle in Pakistan, and instantaneously they start to claim equal rights". I smiled and looked away from him.

President Reagan proclaimed January 18, 1988 as Martin Luther King Day, and designated the third Monday of January each year as a public holiday in honour of the "birthday of Martin Luther King Jr".

The question is, that why now it is found necessary to recognise the services of a coloured leader, twenty years after his assassination, with extensive propaganda throughout the country? Is it a part of countering any sort of racial tension inside the States, or anything else?

#### Martin Luther King Day

Mr. Reagan in his proclamation desired, "The work of justice and freedom continues, but its goal is less distant, its hardships more tolerable, and its triumph more sure".

However, frankly speaking, the young generation of the United States white race, believes that the former African slaves, now negroes, deserve much more rights, benefits and facilities than the "selfish" newly migrated Asians. As the fore-fathers of negroes had come to share the tough times, much before the harvest. This simmering lava may erupt, sooner or later, sweeping away the pan-racialistic image of the United States.

/12223

**Zia's "Coups" Seen As Having Dire Consequences**  
46000161a Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English  
12 Jun 88 p 4

[Article by Khalid Akhtar: "Zia's Constitutional Coup and Its Likely Fallout"]

[Text] Much has already been said and written about the possible motives and reasons that might have prompted President Zia to take the extreme step of dissolving the National Assembly and sacking Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo's Government. In the chequered constitutional history of Pakistan this should go as a normal development and the masses here have taken it as such. However, whether or not the President's action will plunge the country into another constitutional crisis remains to be seen.

Who failed whom is being debated and will continue to be debated for some time to come. But perhaps in the existing situation it is not relevant. The docile Premier Junejo and accommodating President Ziaul Haq had for a moment looked a perfect combination to function successfully under the complicated 1985 diarchal arrangement. The two did get along smoothly for a time but inevitably the inherent strains and contradictions of

the system proved too much for them. Their separation was a foregone conclusion. The only surprising thing was that it took place rather abruptly.

### Power Tussle

The under currents in the power tussle between the two had frequently clashed, disturbing now and then the otherwise 'all well' looking facade of the diarchal set-up. What had suited Premier Junejo had not necessarily gone to the advantage of President Zia and vice-versa. Their constituencies were different, hence their priorities were not the same. This explained their different responses and approach to almost every issue, stretching from administrative and political matters to budget making. With the passage of each day a new irritant was added to their already uneasy relationship. The last three months in particular were eventful. The events taking place during this period did more harm to their relationship than the happenings of the last three years put together.

The Geneva Accord on Afghan issue, the Ojheri camp disaster, the deepening economic crisis and finally the Chohar Harpal incident brought the two men at the dead end of the road. And when during the course of a function at the Defence College, Islamabad, President Zia said "We need patrons and not prosecutors", it was a signal that the strong man had decided to strike.

### Miscalculations

But this does not explain the whole situation. There is a view that President Zia would have struck in any case if he was looking beyond 1990, which he apparently is. In his speech of May 30 (the day after the dissolution of Assemblies) President Zia again expressed his reservation about the Parliamentary system. If this is an indicator of future things to come some sort of change in the system appears to be in the offing. Second, and that is all important, remains the question of President's own future role. His renewed emphasis on Islamisation is meaningful. Already as a result of his talks with the ulema in the Presidency a few days back certain steps in this respect have been agreed upon. This should revive the Islamist lobby. In any case President Zia will find it more conducive and convenient to seek endorsement of his mandate in a state of constitutional hiatus. This makes the period between the sacking of the Junejo government and the election of a new National Assembly very significant in giving a direction of things to come.

Mr. Junejo's mis-calculations were great. He was under the impression that there was no going back for Gen. Zia and that the civilian facade was his necessity and that the General would not dismantle the structure that had served as an additional line of defence for him. These calculations were not based on illusion either. But Mr. Junejo had forgotten the one glaring reality that under the Eighth Amendment he had given Gen. Zia too many options and too much ground for manoeuvrability. In

the country's history hardly any other individual has been vested with more constitutional powers and authority than Gen. Ziaul Haq. Throughout his tenure in office Mr. Junejo had flourished on borrowed power. While Gen. Zia had all along been conscious of his authority, Mr. Junejo scarcely realised the vulnerability of his position.

But Gen. Zia has no solution ready in his hand. He has taken quite some time (to be precise 11 days) to form a caretaker cabinet (and that too without a Prime Minister). He had expected to set up the infrastructure much earlier. But he is not as such facing any serious threat from any quarter. The fragmented political forces, which remain antagonised with each other, pose him no great challenge. Then he continues to enjoy the much needed political support from certain quarters and groups. The Muslim League is still at his command and disposal. Though the Jamaat has distanced itself from Gen. Zia there remain areas of convergence such as the enforcement of Shariat and Afghan issue between the two that can lead to revival of cooperation among them. In this respect the next two months will be very crucial. Finally Gen. Zia can legitimately expect that some splinter groups may well associate themselves with him to share the spoils of power.

### New System

The dissolution of Assemblies should never be a desirable step. But ironically this undemocratic measure has in most cases been welcomed and hailed here. This reflects sadly on the level of maturity of our political parties. It should have served the cause of democracy well if the Junejo government had been allowed to complete its term and elections were held as scheduled in 1990. The most important thing to remember is that now Gen. Zia will be holding elections at his convenience and at a time of his own choosing. In any electoral exercise this factor is always of crucial bearing. Secondly there remains the possibility that Gen. Zia may push an amendment of greater dimension than the Eighth Amendment through the new House. The air is already filled with rumours that the Presidential system may be reintroduced.

But this is not to suggest in any way that the President is the gainer. Compared to few tactical gains that the surprise move has brought for him, the losses suffered by him are far greater. His credentials as a democrat, already doubted, will be subjected to greater scrutiny from now onward. The much-trumpeted exercise of 'transfer of power' has proved a half-way measure. Thirdly in Mr. Junejo the President may have to confront with a new enemy. Finally, after his May 29 action the President is now with one option less to deal with the nasty situation and his capacity for manoeuvrability has proportionally diminished. A creator has often found his creation above himself. Gen. Zia may also find the vagaries of his system a bit too complicated for himself, as time passes by.



### All Not Well

It was one of the few rare occasions that America apparently did not know about an impending political change in the country before hand. Mr. Ralph's the US envoy, meeting Benazir Bhutto immediately after dissolution of assemblies was probably intended more to convey to Gen. Zia the U.S. annoyance than anything else. But this is an insignificant ripple and nothing meaningful can be derived from it. Over the years, Gen. Zia has learnt how to get along with the Americans.

By cancelling his all-important visit to the United States, President Zia has acknowledged that all is not well at home. He has looked stable but he can never be sure of political trends. Something unexpected could happen any time. There are few prospects that the polls could be held within the stipulated period of 90 days. But it is least likely to lead to any constitutional litigation like the one which followed the July, 5, 1977 takeover. However, there are enough irritants to compound the confusion. Unfortunately, in our case the whole political struggle has been reduced to the level of military-civilian tussle for control, over the state affairs. Junejo-Zia partnership in government was marred by this unfortunate tug of war. This is a dangerous state of affairs and the earlier the country leaves this legacy of long martial law rule behind it, the better prospects it would have of surviving and flourishing as a free and democratic polity.

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### Commentary Alleges Zia Removing Freedom 46000160b Karachi DAWN in English 12 Jun 88 p 7

[Article by Ayaz Amir: "Haven't We Been Here Before?"]

[Text] There is a sense of *deja vu* about the events now unfolding in the country. The dissolution of the assemblies, the removal of the Cabinet, the reasons adduced for the same and the agenda for a brave new future all have a familiar ring about them. From the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad in 1954 to Gen. Ayub's coup in 1958 and Gen. Zia's in 1977 the pattern has been the same.

The dismissed men have been blamed for all the disasters of the past while the strongmen coming in their place have promised to set everything right and open the gates on a bright new dawn. It has not been any different this time. General Zia has blamed the Junejo Government for corruption, a breakdown of law and order and for failing to move in the direction of Islamisation, while pledging to address these problems himself with renewed fervour and determination.

Junejo's was not a perfect administration but the sins for which it is being lambasted did not exactly originate during its tenure. The roots of those sins lie buried in the

legacy of eight and a half years of Martial Law. The ministers and the legislators of the Junejo government certainly made hay during their brief hour of sunshine but then who hasn't in this country given even half the opportunity? Was the Martial law government completely free from the strain of corruption? It would be hard to give an unqualified 'yes' to that question.

The law and order charge also has to be taken with a pinch of salt. Lawlessness has definitely increased in the country but on any honest estimate the roots of this tendency go beyond the Junejo government. Karachi has been given over to lawlessness because no one cared to understand the mounting problems assailing its poorer suburbs during the long years of Martial Law. Did any one give a thought to the civic deterioration taking place in the city or to the creation of mafia dens such as Sohrab Goth or the availability on a grand scale of automatic weapons not only in Karachi but throughout the length and breadth of the country? In any case, lawlessness in Karachi or Sind can scarcely be used as an excuse to suspend parliamentary government throughout the country. If Sind alone was causing concern, it could have been placed under Governor's rule. Sind certainly is not more troubled than East Punjab in India but the killings there have not been used as an excuse to do away with parliamentary government in the rest of the country.

As for Islamisation, what can one say about it? Short of reconverting the entire population to Islam there is not much that the Junejo government could have done about it. True, he did not succumb to the pressures of the fundamentalist fringe which was trying to push the Shariat Bill and the 9th Amendment but for that he deserves the thanks of the vast majority of the Pakistani people. These pieces of prospective legislation are the handiwork of people long on enthusiasm but short on wisdom and tolerance. It would ever go to Junejo's credit that he refused to be pushed around by them. But at any rate, if the charge that Junejo did nothing for Islamisation is accepted for a moment, one is entitled to ask what exactly was done by General Zia's Government when it wielded supreme power in Pakistan. If eight and a half years of absolutist rule could not bring us nearer to the desired Islamic millenium, surely three years were insufficient for dramatic steps in that direction. The truth, however, as we know all too well, is that Islam has been used once too often as a political device meant to legitimise this action or that. But to do so repeatedly is no service to Islam because it tends to drag into the hurlyburly of common politics something that should remain far above it.

The real reasons for Junejo's dismissal are, of course, not a secret. The poor man took the Constitution a bit too literally and tried to act the part of the chief Executive that, according to the Constitution, was his to perform. He made administrative changes (transfers of Secretaries, etc) that did not go down well with the President. He removed the latter's men from the Cabinet. He allowed political parties to emerge from the woodwork of Martial

Law. This, too, went against the grain of the President's thinking who has always viewed organised political activity as one of the principal sources of evil. Junejo even tried to inject elements of realism into the regime's hardline Afghan policy, calling for this purpose the all parties conference without consulting the President. One can imagine how this would have gone down with the latter. But to crown everything Junejo took his position as Minister of Defence a bit too seriously. Reportedly, he took issue with certain proposals for high-level promotion coming from the GHQ. And, most culpably of all, he seemed to go along with the Cabine. sub-committee set up to look into the Ojheri Camp disaster which reportedly wanted to pin the blame for it on the titans of the high command who were responsible for running guns to the Afghan resistance and locating Ojheri Camp in the midst of Pindi and Islamabad. This clearly was going too far. The military had resisted interference by Bhutto. Would they have accepted it from a lesser man, one, moreover, who was beholden to the President for his elevation to the Prime Ministership?

Yet Junejo, the unassuming politician from Sindhri, would be remembered for trying to make political life more tolerant in this most intolerant of countries. He presided over a remarkable democratic opening in which political activity was more unfettered and the Press more free than at any time during the last twenty years. Political opponents were not hounded and the idiom of politics became more humane and civilised. If only the military were to realise it, there was a functional side to this tolerance as well. It deprived the political parties of their major slogan against the Zia regime, as result of which the challenge that they seemed to pose to the regime when Martial Law was lifted at the end of 1985 became progressively weaker. And the system gained in strength, besides acquiring a badly needed coat of respectability. But now everything has been reversed and if things are driven to their logical conclusion, the margin of freedom that the country has enjoyed since Junejo became Prime Minister will begin to disappear.

In any case, if the pattern of governmental actions is familiar, so too is the response of the opposition parties. In what must be counted as a supreme act of shortsightedness, some of them have welcomed General Zia's so-called "constitutional" coup and are waiting with bated breath for the holding of "free and fair elections" within ninety days. As if General Zia has gone to the extent and trouble of dismissing Junejo and company only to hand over power to his enemies. Such a scenario strains ordinary, everyday belief but it seems not to strain the credulity of some of our opposition parties.

When General Zia postponed elections for the first time in September 1977 the PPP was stung. In November 1979, at the time of the second postponement it was the PNA and Air Marshal Asghar Khan who were stung. Now it seems some other politicians in their wisdom are rushing headlong into a repeat of the events of 1977. If only they could be persuaded to take that familiar

passage from Marx closely to heart: "Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of treat importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce." This time round they should be preparing for a farce of grand proportions.

Already insinuations to the effect that it might not be possible to hold elections within ninety days are beginning to get louder. Sardar Qayyum who should know what is going on has said as much and so has the newly revived supremo of the frontier, General Fazle Haq. Can their caveats be dismissed lightly?

Anyhow, although political memories may be short, we have travelled this road before. The 1977 elections were sacrificed at the altar of Islamisation and accountability (and also for a time, improving the economy). The agenda that the President has set himself this time is of equally grand proportions: restoring law and order, rooting out the evil of corruption and raising the standard of Islam. Who in his right senses can think that this agenda can be completed in ninety days?

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**Karachi Teachers Deplore Campus Violence**  
46000161b Islamabad THE MUSLIM (Supplement) in  
English 24 Jun 88 p IV

[Article by Rashid Ali Khan: "Violence at the Campus"]

[Text] Over the years there has been quite a considerable increase in the acts of violence at the Karachi University Campus. And so is the case as far as the discipline is concerned.

Hitherto like that of the university administration, the representative body of the teachers—the Karachi University Teachers Society (KUTS) had apparently been indifferent to these happenings.

But they could no longer adopt such an attitude as in the past several days, there were events involving the teachers.

The office of a female professor at the Zoology Department was ransacked by a students group. There were reports of firing at the residences of the teachers at the campus and some of the students were reportedly involved in chanting slogans at the houses of the teachers as well as misbehaving with them.

The Executive Committee of KUTS met at the Campus on June 15 to review the situation. The participants of the meeting expressed their grave concern over the happenings and demanded of the University administration to take action against the students involved.



Four days later a meeting of the KUTS General Body was convened to discuss in detail the issue arising out of the indiscipline among the students.

The prevailing trend was condemned by all the members of the teaching community. They also deplored all such acts in which the KUTS members were abused or manhandled besides expressing their annoyance over the incidents in which the groups of students have interfered with the administrative and academic functions of the university.

At the KUTS General body meeting, three resolutions were adopted unanimously.

The first one reads: "teachers of this university will not submit to coercion, intimidation, verbal abuse and physical violence nor will they allow interference in the normal academic and administrative functions of the university. Violence by groups of students against other students as well as forcible prevention of pursuits of the academic rights of the students by any group should not be tolerated. This general body authorises the executive council of KUTS to react immediately when such acts of terrorisation against teachers take place. This action may include call to implement selective or a total boycott of academic activities". The other resolution said: "illegitimate occupation of University rooms and forcible control of University facilities by politically motivated groups of students should be checked and their lawful restoration to proper authorities should be initiated forthwith. In the event of breakdown of authority and major cases of indiscipline including violence the University administrative should use its utmost powers to restore normalcy and bring culprits to justice".

Yet another resolution stated: "KUTS recognises the problems of non-existence of a representative student body. Till such a time that a representative body emerges through electoral process and it demands that such a process accelerated, the recently established students council representing different shades of opinion, should be encouraged to present the legitimate concerns of the student body and solve their problems through constructive dialogue at department and administrative level".

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**Editorial Urges Politics Without Divisiveness**  
46000160a Karachi DAWN in English 14 Jun 88 p 7

[Article: "Politics Without Divisiveness"]

[Text] The idea of a conference of all political parties is once again on the cards, the purported aim being to fashion a collective response to the situation created by the event of May 29. An all-party conference (APC) was held last August also and it is a matter of opinion whether it served to reduce the area of misunderstanding among the political parties and groupings, especially between MRD and non-MRD parties. At this point of

time, however, the call for a fresh APC assumes added significance because it appears to be one of the many moves being made by some political parties to form bilateral or multilateral understanding on the premise that a general election is to be held within the constitutionally stipulated 90-day period beginning from May 29. On this assumption, the PAC must be seen essentially as a means to an end, and not an end in itself, the end being to keep up pressure on the caretaker government to do its constitutional duty and to explore the prospects of inter-party coordination and cooperation wherever possible. However, the major task of the political parties now is to re-establish rapport with the people that has been seriously weakened because of the long period of depoliticisation leading up to the non-party election of February 1985. The boycott of that exercise, it is now accepted by some of the parties, was a mistake; it only widened the gap between the people and the parties—a situation that served the interest of anti-democratic forces and put a heavy premium on money, beradari, tribalism, clannish affiliations and other narrow loyalties as prime determinants of electoral success.

Pakistan's social structure is a weak prop for democracy. Dominated largely by the agrarian aristocrats our politics has revolved round feudal personalities who, because of their social control over rural communities, find it easy to manipulate largely illiterate village populations. The other influential class is that of comprador industrialists whose interests are well served by links in the right places in the bureaucracy and by association with foreign principals. Neither of the two classes has a very great stake in the development and consolidation of representative rule in the country. At its higher levels the salariat is drawn largely from the economically dominant classes. As a class the salariat is not too enamoured of the political clout of elective bodies. This powerful alliance of interests directly or indirectly influences or controls the institutions of State power. The elitism of the Establishment has found expression in such phenomena as the miserably low rate of mass literacy, the development of two parallel systems of education, one for the rich and the other for the poor, the absence of mass transit systems in our cities alongside a tremendous increase in the number of private cars and the decline of public hospitals in the midst of a rapid increase in the number of posh medical establishments meant for the privileged minority. It goes without saying that this elitism militates against the representative system and the concept of the rulers' accountability to the people. Furthering the cause of democracy the equity in this social setting is an uphill task requiring imaginative planning, dedication and patience. When independence came, provinces constituting Pakistan were not without their small share of representative institutions or without some kind of tradition of parliamentary democracy. The gradual weakening of democratic institutions and the repeated breaks in the continuity of representative government brought us to a situation where, some seventeen years after the secession of the eastern wing, the remaining part of Pakistan feels uncertain about its future. The



rise of centrifugal tendencies, ethnic pressures, a worsening of the law and order situation, urban turmoil and strife and conditions of near anarchy in Sind have all contributed to an acute feeling of insecurity among the masses and to a blurring of the focus of orientation in the political and other spheres of life. In this bleak scenario, the people look to the political parties for guidance and reassurance. The experiment of controlled democracy has repeatedly failed, bringing in its wake additional problems of regional alienation, impairment of the constitutional process and soon, and in the process, raising questions about the viability of the federal structure and even threatening national unity. Frequent denial of political rule has been an unmitigated regression in our case—without the incidental benefits of economic progress, social stability and a clean administration as a compensation. Worse still, because the system of privileges brooks no accountability, financial and political

corruption touched new heights. In this situation it is the political profession which is supposed to provide the people with a sense of direction, overcome the political apathy which holds vast sections of the population in its grip and illumine the path of a return to representative, responsible rule. An over-emphasis on differentiation, factionalism and partisanship will only alienate the people from the political profession as a whole and strengthen the forces ranged against democracy. If the people are to be given hope for the future, the political profession will have to show that it can contain the subjective inclinations and particular interests of its different detachments and is capable of offering a united response to the challenge that the nation faces today.

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